When signaling resolve, is it necessary to go ‘all-in’ and send the strongest possible signal or can sending a lesser signal be effective? Prior research suggests that sending a lesser signal is an admission of irresolution, akin to sending no signal. We make the novel claim that lesser signals of resolve can actually be worse for credibility than sending no signal, particularly in general deterrence situations. We theorize that while the absence of a signal may go unnoticed, a lesser signal puts a spotlight on irresolution. Building on prior findings that high-level visits can function as signals of extended deterrence commitment, we test our theory using new data on visits abroad by the US president, vice president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. We find that only presidential visits are effective at deterring military challenges against the country visited. Visits by lesser officials, whom we dub the ‘B Team’, actually increase the risk of deterrence failure.

中文翻译：

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派出 B 队：决心信号较少的影响


当信号解决时，是否有必要“全力以赴”并发送尽可能最强的信号，或者发送较小的信号是否有效？先前的研究表明，发送较小的信号是承认犹豫不决，类似于不发送信号。我们提出了一个新颖的主张，即较少的决心信号实际上比不发送信号的可信度更差，特别是在一般威慑情况下。我们的理论是，虽然信号的缺失可能会被忽视，但较小的信号会引起人们的犹豫不决。基于先前的发现，即高层访问可以作为延伸威慑承诺的信号，我们使用美国总统、副总统、国务卿和国防部长出国访问的新数据来检验我们的理论。我们发现，只有总统访问才能有效阻止针对访问国的军事挑战。级别较低的官员（我们称之为“B 队”）的访问实际上会增加威慑失败的风险。