Why do insurgents resort to kidnapping in civil war? What explains variation in the selection and intensity of the tactic over time and space? Despite an increase in the use of kidnapping over time, existing research has yet to develop an explanation that explains spatiotemporal variation and extends beyond financial motivations. I argue the decision to kidnap hostages is shaped by insurgents’ behavioral interactions in the conflict environment. It occurs under two conditions: to generate support and reinstate bargaining capacity when organizations suffer military losses on the battlefield and to enforce loyalties and display strength when organizations face violent competition from other non-state actors. The observable implications of the theory are tested at the macro- and micro levels. At the macro-level, I conduct a quantitative cross-group analysis on over 200 organizations involved in an armed intrastate conflict (1989–2018). At the micro level, I consider the kidnapping strategy of the Taliban in Afghanistan over time and space (2010–2018). Taken together, the analyses provide robust support for the theory.

中文翻译：

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劫持平民：内战中的恐怖分子绑架

为什么叛乱分子在内战中诉诸绑架？如何解释策略的选择和强度随时间和空间的变化？尽管随着时间的推移，绑架的使用有所增加，但现有的研究尚未找到一种解释来解释时空变化并超越经济动机。我认为绑架人质的决定是由叛乱分子在冲突环境中的行为互动决定的。它在两个条件下发生：当组织在战场上遭受军事损失时，获得支持并恢复讨价还价能力；当组织面临其他非国家行为者的暴力竞争时，增强忠诚度并展示力量。该理论的可观察含义在宏观和微观层面上得到了检验。在宏观层面，我对参与州内武装冲突（1989-2018）的 200 多个组织进行了定量跨群体分析。在微观层面上，我考虑了阿富汗塔利班在时间和空间上的绑架策略（2010-2018）。总而言之，这些分析为该理论提供了强有力的支持。