Doxastic involuntarism—the thesis that we lack direct voluntary control (in response to non‐evidential reasons) over our belief states—is often touted as philosophical orthodoxy. I here offer a novel defense of doxastic voluntarism, centered around three key moves. First, I point out that belief has two central functional roles, but that discussions of voluntarism have largely ignored questions of control over belief's guidance function. Second, I propose that we can learn much about doxastic control by looking to cognitive scientific research on control over other relevantly similar mental states. I draw on a mechanistic account of control of the guidance function for “emotion‐type states,” and argue that these same cognitive control mechanisms can used to block doxastic guidance. This gives us an account of “back‐end” doxastic control which can be deployed for reasons which are not the right kinds of reasons to support “front‐end” belief formation—i.e., non‐evidential reasons. Third, I argue that comprehensive, self‐directed exercises of this kind of control can amount to an underappreciated kind of voluntarism. This form of voluntarism is available to any account of belief that takes guidance‐instantiation to be at least partly constitutive of believing. Finally, I discuss objections to, and upshots of, the view.

中文翻译：

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后端唯意志主义的辩护

信念非意志论——我们缺乏对我们的信仰状态的直接自愿控制（针对非证据原因）的论点——经常被吹捧为哲学正统学说。在这里，我围绕三个关键举措，对偏执唯意志论进行了新颖的辩护。首先，我指出信仰有两个核心功能，但对唯意志主义的讨论在很大程度上忽略了对信仰引导功能的控制问题。其次，我建议我们可以通过研究对其他相关相似心理状态的控制的认知科学研究来了解更多关于信念控制的知识。我利用了对“情绪型状态”的指导功能控制的机械解释，并认为这些相同的认知控制机制可以用来阻止信念指导。这为我们提供了一种“后端”信念控制的解释，这种控制可以因为与支持“前端”信念形成的正确原因不同的原因而被部署，即非证据原因。第三，我认为这种全面的、自我导向的控制实践可能会导致一种未被充分认识的唯意志主义。这种形式的唯意志论适用于任何以指导实例化至少部分构成信仰的信仰解释。最后，我讨论了对该观点的反对意见和结果。