This paper introduces new data on the creation of subsidiary bodies (SBs) by members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) between 1972 and 2020. Delegation to SBs is one of the principal means through which the UNSC acts, and these bodies are designed to carry out crucial functions such as peacekeeping, implementing sanctions, and investigating crises. Yet, no research has systematically evaluated their creation, design, and use. Our dataset includes a typology of all proposed and created SBs as well as information about their purpose and design. After introducing the data, we empirically analyze the determinants of SB creation. Multivariate regression demonstrates that SBs are more likely to be created when the preferences of the permanent members are aligned. Moreover, stronger bodies are more likely to be created during periods of high preference alignment, while middle- and lower-strength bodies are less influenced by member alignment. These results provide unique evidence demonstrating how politics affects the choice of when and how the UNSC responds to global problems. Our data and analysis paint a picture of a more proactive UNSC than is commonly portrayed in the literature, and these data will enable scholars to further analyze UNSC action.

中文翻译：

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国际和平与安全的政治：引入有关联合国安理会附属机构创建的新数据集

本文介绍了 1972 年至 2020 年间联合国安理会 (UNSC) 成员创建附属机构 (SB) 的新数据。向 SB 授权是 UNSC 行事的主要手段之一，这些机构的设计目的是履行维持和平、实施制裁和调查危机等重要职能。然而，还没有研究系统地评估它们的创造、设计和使用。我们的数据集包括所有提议和创建的 SB 的类型以及有关其目的和设计的信息。在引入数据后，我们实证分析了SB创建的决定因素。多元回归表明，当常任理事国的偏好一致时，SB 更有可能被创建。此外，在高偏好阵营期间更有可能创建更强的机构，而中、低强度机构受成员阵营的影响较小。这些结果提供了独特的证据，证明政治如何影响联合国安理会何时以及如何应对全球问题的选择。我们的数据和分析描绘了一幅比文献中通常描绘的更积极主动的联合国安理会的图景，这些数据将使学者们能够进一步分析联合国安理会的行动。