It's often thought that when we reason to new judgments in inference, we aim at believing the truth, and that this aim of ours can explain important psychological and normative features of belief. I reject this picture: the structure of aimed activity shows that inference is not guided by a truth‐aim. This finding clears the way for a positive understanding of how epistemic goods feature in our doxastic lives. We can indeed make sense of many of our inquisitive and deliberative activities as undertaken in pursuit of such goods; but the evidence‐guided inferences in which those activities culminate will require a different theoretical approach.

中文翻译：

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审判漫无目的的心

人们常常认为，当我们在推理中做出新的判断时，我们的目标是相信真理，而我们的这一目标可以解释信仰的重要心理和规范特征。我拒绝这样的想法：目标活动的结构表明推理不是由真理目标指导的。这一发现为积极理解认知商品在我们的信仰生活中的特征扫清了道路。我们确实可以理解我们为追求这些商品而进行的许多好奇和深思熟虑的活动；但这些活动最终以证据为指导的推论将需要不同的理论方法。