I examine the effect of the policing capacity of traditional authorities (TAs) on communal conflict. TAs of ethnic groups use distinct customary laws and dispute-resolution mechanisms. Their coexistence with national norms and those of other TAs results in parallel legal systems. I argue that this generates uncertainties about norms and vertical and horizontal jurisdictional conflict, which increases the risk of communal conflict. However, this effect can be dampened by state-level rules on norm collisions, which lead to a system of co-production and less violence. To investigate these claims, I use global georeferenced expert survey data on customary policing of TAs and data measuring their constitutional regulation. I show that customary policing can have an adverse effect on communal peace. More subgroups of the larger ethnic group with policing institutions increase the risk of conflict. State-level regulation moderates these relationships. Additional evidence suggests that policing increases communal conflict through vertical jurisdictional conflict but otherwise achieves its intended purpose of providing security.

中文翻译：

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传统权威、规范冲突和社区冲突

我研究了传统当局（TA）的治安能力对社区冲突的影响。各族裔群体的TA使用不同的习惯法和争端解决机制。它们与国家规范和其他技术援助规范共存，形成了平行的法律体系。我认为这会产生规范以及纵向和横向管辖冲突的不确定性，从而增加社区冲突的风险。然而，国家层面关于规范冲突的规则可能会削弱这种影响，从而形成共同生产体系并减少暴力。为了调查这些说法，我使用了有关 TA 常规警务的全球地理参考专家调查数据以及衡量其宪法监管的数据。我表明，习惯性治安可能会对社区和平产生不利影响。拥有警察机构的较大族裔群体中的更多子群体增加了冲突的风险。州级监管调节这些关系。其他证据表明，治安通过纵向管辖冲突增加了社区冲突，但以其他方式实现了提供安全的预期目的。