I defend against a salient objection the thesis that practical rationality requires us to perform intentional actions. The objection is that if rationality requires the performance of intentional actions, then agents are irrational for failing to succeed in what they intend to do. I reply to this objection by hewing closely to the principle that the rational ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. We are rationally required not to successfully realize the content of our intentions but to exercise the fallible abilities in our possession. Taking this line permits us to agree that we are not irrational for failing to succeed, while also endorsing the anti-Internalist claim that practical rationality embraces intentional actions themselves, rather than merely the beliefs and intentions that prompt and sustain them.

中文翻译：

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非理性的失败

我反对一个明显的反对意见，即实践理性要求我们采取有意的行动。反对意见是，如果理性要求执行有意识的行动，那么代理人就会因为未能成功地完成他们打算做的事情而成为非理性的。我通过严格遵守理性“应该”暗示“可以”这一原则来回答这一反对意见。理性地要求我们不要成功地实现我们的意图的内容，而是要运用我们所拥有的易犯错误的能力。采取这条路线使我们同意我们并非因为失败而变得非理性，同时也支持反内在主义的主张，即实践理性包含有意的行为本身，而不仅仅是促进和维持这些行为的信念和意图。