Is it possible to develop a robust crisis management response in a system where governance is characterized by coercive power and adversarial bargaining rather than the diversity, inclusion, and openness highlighted by extant scholarship as conducive factors for robustness? Using two instances of crisis in the European Union—the Eurozone crisis (2010‒2015) and COVID-19 pandemic (2020‒2022)—the paper argues that how actors reinterpret existing rules and institutions offers an important source of robustness in crisis management. Based on the employment of a disaggregation of robustness into degrees of robustness, as well as the concepts of ideational and institutional power, we show how actors can counter the coercive power of dominant coalitions and open up for rule adaptation through reinterpretations of existing rules that, at least in the short term, can solidify the functioning of existing institutions faced by turbulence. In the context of the Eurozone crisis, ideational and institutional power thus enabled a moderately robust response without treaty reform. In the case of the pandemic, it was possible to convince (particularly German) policymakers of the need to employ new ideas about common debt. This meant less need to employ ideational and institutional power by other actors, leading to significantly more effective crisis management than in the Eurozone crisis, what the paper terms maximal robustness.

中文翻译：

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经济思想在行动中的思想稳健性：十年危机期间欧盟经济治理的案例

在一个治理以强制力和对抗性讨价还价为特征，而不是现有学术所强调的多样性、包容性和开放性作为稳健性有利因素的体系中，是否有可能制定强有力的危机管理应对措施？本文以欧盟的两个危机实例——欧元区危机（2010-2015 年）和 COVID-19 大流行（2020-2022 年）为例，认为行动者如何重新解释现有规则和机构为危机管理提供了稳健性的重要来源。基于将稳健性分解为稳健性程度，以及观念和制度权力的概念，我们展示了行动者如何对抗主导联盟的强制力，并通过重新解释现有规则来适应规则，至少在短期内，可以巩固面临动荡的现有机构的运作。在欧元区危机的背景下，理念和制度力量在不进行条约改革的情况下实现了适度强有力的应对。在大流行的情况下，有可能说服（特别是德国）政策制定者相信有必要对共同债务采用新的想法。这意味着更少需要利用其他参与者的理念和制度力量，从而导致比欧元区危机更有效的危机管理，即本文所说的最大稳健性。