According to orthodoxy, the most fundamental kind of causation involves one event causing another event. I argue against this event‐causal view. Instead, the most fundamental kind of causation is thing causation, which involves a thing causing a thing to do something. Event causation is reducible to thing causation, but thing causation is not reducible to event causation, because event causation cannot accommodate cases of fine‐grained causation. I defend my view from objections, including C. D. Broad's influential “timing” argument, and I conclude with implications for agent‐causal theories of free will.

中文翻译：

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事物因果关系

根据正统观念，最基本的因果关系涉及一个事件导致另一个事件。我反对这种事件因果关系的观点。相反，最基本的因果关系是事物因果关系，它涉及事物导致事物做某事。事件因果关系可以简化为事物因果关系，但事物因果关系不能简化为事件因果关系，因为事件因果关系无法适应细粒度因果关系的情况。我为我的观点辩护，反对反对意见，包括 CD Broad 颇具影响力的“时间”论点，并以对自由意志的主体因果理论的影响作为结论。