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Moorean Paradox in Practice: How Knowledge of Action Can Be First-Personal
Australasian Journal of Philosophy ( IF 1.0 ) Pub Date : 2024-03-03 , DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2319778 Alec Hinshelwood 1
Australasian Journal of Philosophy ( IF 1.0 ) Pub Date : 2024-03-03 , DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2024.2319778 Alec Hinshelwood 1
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We know our own intentional actions in a distinctively first-personal way. Many accounts of knowledge of intentionally doing something, A, assume that grounds for the knowledge would have to establ...
中文翻译:
实践中的摩尔悖论:行动知识如何成为第一人称
我们以独特的第一人称方式了解自己的有意行为。许多关于有意做某事的知识的描述,A,假设知识的基础必须建立......
更新日期:2024-03-06
中文翻译:
实践中的摩尔悖论:行动知识如何成为第一人称
我们以独特的第一人称方式了解自己的有意行为。许多关于有意做某事的知识的描述,A,假设知识的基础必须建立......