Intentionalism is the view that perceptual phenomenology depends on perceptual content. The aim of this paper is to make explicit an ambiguity in usual formulations of intentionalism, and to argue in favor of one way to disambiguate it. It concerns whether perceptual phenomenology depends on the content of one and only one representation (often construed as being identical to a certain perceptual experience), or instead depends on a collection of many different representations throughout the perceptual system. We argue in favor of the latter option. Intentionalism so conceived can make better sense of contemporary neuroscience of perception, and is better equipped to confront several influential objections to traditional intentionalism.

中文翻译：

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多对一意向主义

意向主义认为知觉现象学依赖于知觉内容。本文的目的是明确意向主义通常表述中的歧义，并主张一种消除歧义的方法。它涉及感知现象学是否依赖于一种且仅有一种表征的内容（通常被解释为与某种感知体验相同），还是依赖于整个感知系统中许多不同表征的集合。我们赞成后一种选择。这样构想的意向主义可以更好地理解当代感知神经科学，并且能够更好地应对对传统意向主义的一些有影响力的反对意见。