I like the view that the fundamental facts are logically simple, not complex. However, some universal generalizations and negations may appear fundamental, because they cannot be explained by logically simple facts about particulars. I explore a natural reply: those universal generalizations and negations are true because certain logically simple facts—call them φφ—are the fundamental facts. I argue that this solution is only available given some metaphysical frameworks, some conceptions of metaphysical explanation and fundamentality. It requires a ‘fitting’ framework, according to which metaphysical theories explain the aptness of representations in terms of how things are fundamentally. Fitting frameworks conceive of the fundamental facts as those that are metaphysically ‘real’; call them the ‘facts-in-reality’. Moreover, we must take as primary a plural notion of the facts-in-reality, not the singular notion of a fact-in-reality. By contrast, a metaphysics that grounds facts is incompatible with my strategy for keeping the fundamental facts logically simple.

中文翻译：

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基本事实在逻辑上可以很简单

我喜欢这样的观点：基本事实在逻辑上是简单的，而不是复杂的。然而，一些普遍的概括和否定可能显得很根本，因为它们不能用关于细节的逻辑上简单的事实来解释。我探索一个自然的答案：那些普遍的概括和否定是正确的，因为某些逻辑上简单的事实——称之为 φφ——是基本事实。我认为这个解决方案只有在某些形而上学框架、形而上学解释和基本原理的某些概念下才可用。它需要一个“合适的”框架，根据这个框架，形而上学理论根据事物的本质来解释表征的恰当性。合适的框架将基本事实视为形而上学“真实”的事实；称它们为“现实中的事实”。此外，我们必须将现实中的事实的复数概念作为主要概念，而不是现实中的事实的单数概念。相比之下，以事实为基础的形而上学与我保持基本事实逻辑简单的策略是不相容的。