Kant’s formula of universal law (FUL) is standardly understood as a test of the moral permissibility of an agent’s maxim: maxims that pass the test are morally neutral, and so permissible, while those that do not are morally impermissible. In contrast, this article argues that the FUL tests whether a maxim is the cause or determining ground of an action at all. According to Kant’s general account of causality, nothing can be a cause of some effect unless there is a lawlike relation between the putative cause and effect. Applied to the case of action, no maxim can be the cause of an agent’s action unless there is a lawlike relation between maxims of that kind and actions of that kind. The special capacity to act according to maxims as lawlike causes is what Kant calls a will; the basic constitutive principle of the will is a nonnormative principle this article calls the categorical declarative. While the actions of a perfectly good will would be described by the categorical declarative alone, human action is determined not only by the causality of the will but also by competing causes—namely, those stemming from inclination. There is thus need for a causal test for putative maxims. The test contained in the FUL is meant to determine whether an action could be grounded solely on the agent’s maxim or whether it requires a cause external to the will. This account permits one to build eventual distinctions concerning the morality of actions on prior and independent distinctions concerning their causality.

中文翻译：

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康德的普遍法则公式作为因果关系的检验

康德的普遍法公式（FUL）通常被理解为对代理人准则的道德允许性的测试：通过测试的准则在道德上是中立的，因此是允许的，而那些没有通过测试的准则在道德上是不允许的。相比之下，本文认为 FUL 测试准则是否是行为的原因或决定依据。根据康德对因果关系的一般解释，除非假定的原因和结果之间存在类似规律的关系，否则任何事物都不能成为某种结果的原因。应用于行动的情况下，任何准则都不能成为代理人行动的原因，除非该类准则与该类行为之间存在类似规律的关系。按照作为规律原因的准则行事的特殊能力就是康德所说的意志。意志的基本构成原则是一种非规范原则，本文称之为绝对陈述性原则。虽然完全善意的行为可以仅用绝对的陈述来描述，但人类的行为不仅由意志的因果关系决定，而且还由竞争的原因决定，即那些源于倾向的原因。因此需要对假定的准则进行因果检验。FUL 中包含的测试旨在确定某个行动是否可以仅基于代理人的准则，或者是否需要意志之外的原因。这种解释允许人们根据关于其因果关系的先前和独立的区别来建立关于行为道德的最终区别。