Crafted within a knowledge-first epistemological framework, Mona Simion’s engaging and wide-ranging work ensures that both the Knowledge Norm of Assertion (KNA) and Classical Invariantism (CI) can be part of a viable and productive research program.Dissatisfied with current strategies on offer in the literature, she successfully counters objections to the pair sourced in “shiftiness intuitions”—intuitions that seem to indicate that mere changes in practical context can impact the propriety of assertions and knowledge attributions. For example, in Keith DeRose’s famous pair of low stakes versus high stakes bank cases, the consequences of Keith’s acting on The bank is open on Saturday if it were false change from trivial in low stakes to catastrophic in high stakes. We are to suppose that the proposition is true, and that Keith has access to the same quantity and quality of evidence for it in both cases. In low stakes, but not in high stakes, we are inclined to think that Keith can appropriately assert to his inquiring wife “The bank is open on Saturday.” In low stakes, Keith’s knowledge ascription “I know that the bank is open on Saturday” strikes us as aptly asserted and true. In high stakes only a knowledge denial on Keith’s part strikes us as aptly asserted and true.If we want to hang on to KNA, it looks like we will have to abandon CI and concede that ‘knows’ or knowledge is sensitive to changes in practical considerations. If we want to retain CI, we can try to say that, while Keith does still know that the bank is open on Saturday in high stakes, he does not have sufficient warrant to properly assert that it is. But such a move seems to run counter to KNA. We appear to be stuck in the Shiftiness Dilemma.Keen to get us out of the dilemma and to preserve the idea that epistemically good thinking and asserting are independent of practical concerns, Simion suggests a strategy that can also be used to protect other epistemic speech-act norms and notions from similar threats of practical shiftiness. She notes that having an impact on the degree of epistemic warrant required is not enough to make a norm an epistemic one. Fair enough. If I am given strong practical reason (a million dollars, or a gun to the head) not to adopt full belief until I have gathered more evidence, there is potentially some nonepistemic norm at work in the demand for further evidence. So it is a live possibility (indeed, a plausible one, as Simion would say) that our intuitions in the Shiftiness Dilemma are being misdescribed: they are tracking all-things-considered propriety of assertion, not epistemic propriety. In high stakes, practical norms override the epistemic norm KNA. Keith’s asserting “The bank is open on Saturday” would be epistemically proper but all-things-considered improper.Simion backs up her account with an etiological-function origin story and typology for the norms of assertion. Here is her characterization of etiological function for traits, artifacts, and actions. E-function.A token of type T has the e-function of type B of producing effect E in a system S iff (1) tokens of T produced E in the past, (2) producing E resulted in benefit of type B in S/S’s ancestors, and (3) producing E’s having B-benefited S’s ancestors contributes to the explanation of why T exists in S.In this schema, norms governing an action are typed by the functions or purposes of the action, which in turn are typed by the benefits the action delivers. The epistemic norm of assertion will be the one that characteristically and reliably enables participants in the practice of assertion to secure its primary epistemic good, which Simion identifies as knowledge (testimonial knowledge in hearers generated under normal conditions by the assertions of knowledgeable speakers). Moves in a practice either directly or indirectly aim at fulfilling the goal of the practice. Assertion is a move in the practice of inquiry, which has the generation of knowledge as its aim. Hence, Simion concludes, assertion aims at generating knowledge.This account helps to explain why, in cases like high stakes, Keith all-things-considered ought not to assert “The bank is open on Saturday,” even though he knows it is true. Prudential norms of assertion override the epistemic KNA, for when multiple functions come into conflict, the ones that are more important to the survival of the organism will generate weightier normative constraints.Simion then applies her account to the general category of constatives—for example, speech acts that express a speaker’s belief and the intention that the hearer form or continue to hold the like belief. Employing the taxonomy of Bach and Harnish, she argues that, as expressions of belief and hence varieties of assertion, constatives are subject to knowledge norms as well. Bach and Harnish identify fifteen different subcategories of constatives, each characterized in terms of the kind of belief and intention they express. The norms governing a species have to be at least as strong as the norms governing the corresponding type. As species of the type assertion, each subcategory, then, is subject to at least the necessary direction of KNA. Ultimately, we arrive at a knowledge norm for every speech act on the list, such as The Knowledge Norm of Conjecture (KNC):One’s conjecture that p is epistemically permissible only if one knows that there is reason, but not sufficient reason, to believe that p. Most of the proposed interpretations of various constatives are on the whole reasonable enough, though J. L. Austin would surely be unhappy to see so many different speech acts fashioned into varieties of assertion. Simion concludes with reflections on conjecturing, telling, and moral assertion.Construing the challenge of shiftiness intuitions in terms of the Shiftiness Dilemma allows Simion to declare success when the compatibility of KNA and CI with the relevant data of intuition is secured. Ensuring empirical adequacy for an explanatory framework is an important step, but pronouncements of victory by way of inference to the best explanation would be premature.Other candidates have been shown to match KNA’s familiar explanatory successes (involving lottery propositions, Moorean statements, etc.). Unlike KNA, alternatives that require only epistemically justified or rational belief or credence can allow that a subject is epistemically proper to assert what they believe when their belief is epistemically rational, even under conditions where there are defeating reasons that they are not in a position to be aware of. Furthermore, such norms seem better suited for philosophical or heated moral discussions where there is little consensus and individuals routinely fail to know that what they assert is true. Simion sounds the alarm that the Shiftiness Dilemma threatens to generalize “to epistemic normativity as a whole” (xi–xii), but norms concerning rational credence seem particularly immune.As Simion notes, the etiological-function model of norms that she proposes could be rebuilt with a different central epistemic aim at its core. Indeed, Millikan-inspired models along these lines are appealed to in other areas in philosophy where the concept of information takes center stage—a concept that may be more amenable to rigorous definition and use in dialogue with the sciences than knowledge. We can wonder, also, what special weight the etiological-function model accords to a knowledge-first perspective on epistemic normativity when the model is malleable in this way.The effectiveness of Simion’s strategy for shielding epistemically good thinking and assertion from practical shiftiness becomes less apparent when we try to apply it to Keith’s belief or judgment that the knowledge ascription/denial he asserts is true. It is unclear whether we are to suppose that, in high stakes, Keith epistemically ought to believe/judge that his asserted knowledge denial is false, but all-things-considered he ought to believe/judge that it is true. We do not have to accept that the knowledge-first, etiological function account of normativity for assertion carries over to belief, of course, but then what progress have we made in accounting for the shiftiness in Keith’s judgment that he knows the bank is open on Saturday in low stakes but not in high stakes?Furthermore, there are other ways to generate problems for fallibilist Classical Invariantists in low versus high stakes pairs of cases. Here is a simplified version of a puzzle from the debate over pragmatic encroachment. Consider low cases where you meet the invariant standards for knowing that p, but your justified confidence falls short of certainty. Among these cases, there must be some where you also meet the invariant standards for knowing that if p is true, then among your choices of action ϕ-ing results in the best overall outcome. Say, for instance, that you have a machine with a ϕ button, and your machine, which you know to be extremely reliable, tells you what the cost or benefit will be if you push the button and p is true versus if p is false. If you ϕ (push the ϕ button) and p is true, you win one hundred dollars; if you ϕ and p is false, you lose one hundred dollars. You face the choice: to ϕ or not to ϕ. Since you know that p, and you know that if p is true, then among your choices of action ϕ-ing results in the best overall outcome, you rationally conclude that ϕ-ing results in the best overall outcome, and hence that you ought to ϕ. If you know which choice of action has the best overall outcome, that is what you all-things-considered should do. Now consider high, where the quantity and quality of your evidence for p is the same, and you still know that your machine is extremely reliable. This time, however, the machine tells you that if you push ϕ and p is true, you win one hundred dollars, but if you push ϕ and p is false, you lose $1 million. Your rational confidence in p is not high enough to justify pushing the button, so you rationally conclude that you ought not to ϕ. Since in high nothing evidentially relevant has changed (all that has changed is the machine informing you of a new, more serious cost of acting on p if p is false), the classical invariantist will have to say that you still know that ϕ, and you still know that if p is true, then among your choices of action ϕ-ing results in the best overall outcome. So, according to CI, you should still be able to reason properly as follows: you know that p, and you know that if p is true, then among your choices of action ϕ-ing results in the best overall outcome, so you know that ϕ-ing results in the best overall outcome, hence you ought to ϕ. Classical invariantists owe us an explanation concerning how we can avoid the paradox here without conceding that knowledge is practically shifty.

中文翻译：

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狡猾的言论和独立的思想：语境中的认知规范性

Mona Simion 在知识优先的认识论框架内精心设计，其引人入胜且范围广泛的工作确保断言知识规范 (KNA) 和经典不变论 (CI) 都可以成为可行且富有成效的研究计划的一部分。她在文献中提出，成功地反驳了对源自“狡猾直觉”的反对意见——这种直觉似乎表明，仅仅实际背景的变化就可能影响断言和知识归因的适当性。例如，在基思·德罗斯（Keith DeRose）著名的两起低风险与高风险银行案件中，如果基思对银行采取的行动是从低风险的微不足道到高风险的灾难性错误变化，那么其后果将在周六公开。我们假设该命题是正确的，并且基思在这两种情况下都可以获得相同数量和质量的证据。在低风险的情况下，但在高风险的情况下，我们倾向于认为基思可以适当地向他询问的妻子断言“银行周六开门。” 在低风险的情况下，基思的知识描述“我知道银行周六开门”给我们留下了恰当的断言和真实的印象。在高风险中，只有基思方面的知识否认才让我们感到恰当地断言和真实。如果我们想坚持 KNA，看起来我们将不得不放弃 CI 并承认“知道”或知识对实际变化很敏感。考虑因素。如果我们想保留 CI，我们可以尝试说，虽然基思仍然知道银行在周六以高风险开放，但他没有足够的证据来正确断言这一点。但这样的举动似乎与KNA背道而驰。我们似乎陷入了狡猾的困境。为了让我们摆脱困境，并保持认知上的良好思考和断言独立于实际问题的观念，西蒙提出了一种也可以用来保护其他认知言论的策略——行为规范和观念来自于类似的实际变化的威胁。她指出，对所需认知依据的程度产生影响不足以使一项规范成为认知规范。很公平。如果我有强有力的实际理由（一百万美元，或者用枪指着头）在我收集到更多证据之前不要完全相信，那么在需要进一步证据的过程中可能存在一些非认知规范在起作用。因此，我们在“狡诈困境”中的直觉被错误描述是一种现实的可能性（事实上，正如西蒙所说，这是一种似是而非的可能性）：它们正在追踪所有事物都被认为是断言的适当性，而不是认知适当性。在高风险中，实践规范凌驾于认知规范 KNA 之上。基思的断言“银行周六开门”在认知上是正确的，但从所有方面来看都是不恰当的。西米恩用病因学功能起源故事和断言规范的类型学来支持她的说法。这是她对特征、伪影的病因功能的描述，和行动。E 函数。类型 T 的代币具有在系统 S 中产生效果 E 的类型 B 的 e 函数，当且仅当 (1) T 的代币过去产生了 E，(2) 产生 E 导致了类型 B 的收益S/S 的祖先，以及 (3) 产生具有 B 受益的 S 祖先的 E 有助于解释为什么 T 存在于 S 中。在这个模式中，管理一个行为的规范是由该行为的功能或目的来确定的，而这些功能或目的又反过来是根据行动所带来的好处来分类的。断言的认知规范将是一种特征性且可靠地使断言实践中的参与者能够确保其主要认知利益的规范，西米恩将其识别为知识（在正常条件下由知识渊博的说话者的断言产生的听者的证言知识）。练习中的动作直接或间接旨在实现练习的目标。断言是探究实践中的一个举动，其目的是产生知识。因此，西蒙得出结论，断言旨在产生知识。这个帐户有助于解释为什么在高风险的情况下，基思考虑到所有事情不应该断言“银行周六开门”，即使他知道这是真的。审慎的断言规范凌驾于认知 KNA 之上，因为当多种功能发生冲突时，对有机体的生存更重要的功能将产生更重要的规范性约束。然后，西米恩将她的解释应用于常量的一般类别，例如，表达说话者的信念以及听话者形成或继续持有类似信念的意图的言语行为。她采用巴赫和哈尼什的分类法，认为作为信念的表达以及断言的各种形式，常量也受到知识规范的约束。巴赫和哈尼什确定了十五个不同的常量子类别，每个子类别都以它们表达的信念和意图的类型为特征。管理一个物种的规范必须至少与管理相应类型的规范一样强大。作为类型断言的种类，每个子类别至少受到 KNA 的必要指导。最终，我们为列表中的每个言语行为得出一个知识规范，例如猜想的知识规范（KNC）：只有当一个人知道有理由（但没有充分理由）相信时，p 的猜想在认识论上是允许的那个 p。大多数对各种陈述句提出的解释总体上是足够合理的，尽管 JL 奥斯汀肯定会不高兴看到这么多不同的言语行为被塑造成各种各样的断言。Simion 最后对猜想、讲述和道德断言进行了反思。根据 Shiftiness 困境来解释 Shiftiness 直觉的挑战，当 KNA 和 CI 与相关直觉数据的兼容性得到保证时，Simion 可以宣布成功。确保解释框架的经验充分性是重要的一步，但通过推断最佳解释来宣布胜利还为时过早。其他候选者已被证明与 KNA 熟悉的解释成功相匹配（涉及彩票命题、摩尔陈述等） 。与 KNA 不同，仅需要认识论上合理的或理性的信念或信任的替代方案可以允许主体在认识论上正确地断言他们所相信的东西，当他们的信念是认识上理性的时，即使在存在他们无法证明的理由的情况下意识到。此外，此类规范似乎更适合哲学或激烈的道德讨论，在这些讨论中几乎没有达成共识，而且个人通常不知道他们所主张的内容是真实的。西蒙敲响了警钟，称“狡诈困境”可能会泛化为“作为一个整体的认知规范性”（xi-xii），但有关理性信任的规范似乎特别免疫。正如西蒙指出的，她提出的规范的病因功能模型可以是以不同的中心认知目标为核心进行重建。事实上，受密立根启发的模型在哲学的其他领域也很有吸引力，其中信息概念占据了中心舞台——这个概念可能比知识更适合严格的定义和与科学对话中的使用。我们还可以想知道，当模型以这种方式具有可塑性时，病因功能模型对认知规范性的知识第一视角赋予了什么样的特殊权重。西蒙的保护认知上良好的思维和断言免受实际变化影响的策略的有效性变得较小当我们试图将其应用于基思的信念或判断时，他所断言的知识归因/否认是真实的，这一点就显而易见了。目前还不清楚我们是否应该假设，在高风险下，基思在认识上应该相信/判断他所断言的知识否认是错误的，但综合考虑，他应该相信/判断这是真的。当然，我们不必接受知识优先、对断言的规范性的病因学功能解释延续到信念，但是我们在解释基思的判断中的变化方面取得了哪些进展，他知道银行是开放的星期六在低赌注中，但在高赌注中则不然？此外，还有其他方法可以在低赌注与高赌注对的情况下给易错论古典不变论者带来问题。这是关于实用主义侵犯的争论中的一个谜题的简化版本。考虑一些低情况，您满足知道 p 的不变标准，但您的合理置信度缺乏确定性。在这些情况中，一定有一些情况您也满足不变标准，即知道如果 p 为真，那么在您的行动选择中 ψ-ing 会产生最佳的总体结果。举例来说，假设您有一台带有 phi 按钮的机器，你知道你的机器非常可靠，它会告诉你，如果你按下按钮，p 为 true 与 p 为 false 时的成本或收益是什么。如果您 p​​hi（按下 phi 按钮）且 p 为真，您将赢得 100 美元；如果你的 phi 和 p 是假的，你会损失一百美元。你面临着选择：选择 phi 或不选择 phi。因为你知道 p，并且你知道如果 p 为真，那么在你的行动选择中 ψ-ing 会产生最好的总体结果，你理性地得出结论 ψ-ing 会产生最好的总体结果，因此你应该到 。如果您知道哪种行动选择具有最佳的总体结果，那么这就是您综合考虑后应该做的事情。现在考虑高，其中 p 证据的数量和质量相同，并且您仍然知道您的机器非常可靠。然而，这一次，机器告诉你，如果你推动 phi 且 p 为真，你会赢得 100 美元，但如果你推动 phi 且 p 为假，你会损失 100 万美元。你对 p 的理性信心不够高，不足以证明按下按钮是合理的，因此你理性地得出结论，你不应该按下 phi。由于在高位没有任何明显相关的改变（所有改变的是机器通知你如果 p 为假，对 p 采取行动的新的、更严重的成本），经典不变论者将不得不说你仍然知道 phi ，并且你仍然知道，如果 p 为真，那么在你选择的行动中 ψ-ing 会产生最佳的整体结果。因此，根据 CI，你仍然应该能够正确地进行如下推理：你知道 p，并且你知道如果 p 为真，那么在你的行动选择中 ψ-ing 会产生最佳的整体结果，所以你知道ψ-ing 会产生最佳的总体结果，因此您应该 ψ。经典不变论者欠我们一个解释，说明如何避免这里的悖论，同时又不承认知识实际上是变化无常的。所以你理性地得出结论，你不应该 phi。由于在高位没有任何明显相关的改变（所有改变的是机器通知你如果 p 为假，对 p 采取行动的新的、更严重的成本），经典不变论者将不得不说你仍然知道 phi ，并且你仍然知道，如果 p 为真，那么在你选择的行动中 ψ-ing 会产生最佳的整体结果。因此，根据 CI，你仍然应该能够正确地进行如下推理：你知道 p，并且你知道如果 p 为真，那么在你的行动选择中 ψ-ing 会产生最佳的整体结果，所以你知道ψ-ing 会产生最佳的总体结果，因此您应该 ψ。经典不变论者欠我们一个解释，说明如何避免这里的悖论，同时又不承认知识实际上是变化无常的。所以你理性地得出结论，你不应该 phi。由于在高位没有任何明显相关的改变（所有改变的是机器通知你如果 p 为假，对 p 采取行动的新的、更严重的成本），经典不变论者将不得不说你仍然知道 phi ，并且你仍然知道，如果 p 为真，那么在你选择的行动中 ψ-ing 会产生最佳的整体结果。因此，根据 CI，你仍然应该能够正确地进行如下推理：你知道 p，并且你知道如果 p 为真，那么在你的行动选择中 ψ-ing 会产生最佳的整体结果，所以你知道ψ-ing 会产生最佳的总体结果，因此您应该 ψ。经典不变论者欠我们一个解释，说明如何避免这里的悖论，同时又不承认知识实际上是变化无常的。