Many philosophers have been attracted to a restricted version of the principle of indifference in the case of self-locating belief. Roughly speaking, this principle states that, within any given possible world, one should be indifferent between different hypotheses concerning who one is within that possible world, so long as those hypotheses are compatible with one's evidence. My first goal is to defend a more precise version of this principle. After responding to several existing criticisms of such a principle, I argue that existing formulations of the principle are crucially ambiguous, and I go on to defend a particular disambiguation of the principle. According to the disambiguation I defend, how we should apply this restricted principle of indifference sensitively depends on our background metaphysical beliefs. My second goal is to apply this disambiguated principle to classical skeptical problems in epistemology. In particular, I argue that Eternalism threatens to lead us to external world skepticism, and Modal Realism threatens to lead us to inductive skepticism.

中文翻译：

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中心冷漠和怀疑

在自我定位信念的情况下，许多哲学家都被冷漠原则的限制版本所吸引。粗略地说，这一原则指出，在任何给定的可能世界中，一个人应该对关于一个人是谁的不同假设保持漠不关心。在那个可能的世界中，只要这些假设与证据相一致。我的首要目标是捍卫这一原则的更精确版本。在回应了对该原则的一些现有批评后，我认为该原则的现有表述极其模糊，并且我继续为该原则的特定消除歧义辩护。根据我所捍卫的消歧义，我们应该如何敏感地应用这种有限的冷漠原则取决于我们背景的形而上学信仰。我的第二个目标是将这种消除歧义的原则应用于认识论中的经典怀疑论问题。特别是，我认为永恒主义有可能导致我们对外部世界的怀疑论，而模态实在论有可能导致我们陷入归纳怀疑论。