Certain kinds of prediction, foreknowledge, and future-oriented action appear to require settled future truths. But open futurists think that the future is metaphysically unsettled: if it is open whether p is true, then it cannot currently be settled that p is true. So, open futurists—and libertarians who adopt the position—face the objection that their view makes rational action and deliberation impossible. I defuse the epistemic concern: open futurism does not entail obviously counterintuitive epistemic consequences or prevent rational action.

中文翻译：

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自由、预知和投注

某些类型的预测、预知和面向未来的行动似乎需要确定的未来真理。但开放未来主义者认为，未来在形而上学上是不确定的：如果p是否为真是开放的，那么当前就无法确定p是否为真。因此，开放的未来主义者——以及采取这一立场的自由主义者——面临着这样的反对意见，即他们的观点使理性行动和深思熟虑变得不可能。我消除了认知上的担忧：开放的未来主义不会带来明显违反直觉的认知后果或阻止理性行动。