I argue that unless belief is voluntary in a very strict sense – that is, unless credence is simply under our direct control – there can be no practical reasons to believe. I defend this view against recent work by Susanna Rinard. I then argue that for very similar reasons, barring the truth of strict doxastic voluntarism, there cannot be epistemic reasons to act, only purely practical reasons possessed by those whose goal is attaining knowledge or justified belief.

中文翻译：

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相信的实际理由、行动的认知理由以及困惑的行动理论家

我认为，除非信仰在严格意义上是自愿的——也就是说，除非信任完全在我们的直接控制之下——否则就没有实际的理由去相信。我针对苏珊娜·里纳德 (Susanna Rinard) 最近的工作来捍卫这一观点。然后，我认为，出于非常相似的原因，除了严格的唯意志论的真理之外，不可能有行动的认知理由，只有那些目标是获得知识或合理信仰的人所拥有的纯粹的实践理由。