There are many historical concerns about freedom that have come to be deemphasized in the free will literature itself—for instance, worries around the tyranny of government or the alienation of capitalism. It is hard to see how the current free will literature respects these, or indeed how they could even find expression. This paper seeks to show how these and other concerns can be reintegrated into the debate by appealing to a levels ontology. Recently, Christian List and others have considered how the notion of levels could be relevant to the free will debate. Invariably, however, the focus is on the significance of facts at lower levels. The threats come from below, from fundamental physics or neuroscience. Here, I aim to show how we can frame many interesting concerns about free will in terms of threats from above. After arguing that determination from above is no less threatening, I catalogue such concerns that might constitute threats to our freedom. Doing this not only allows us to show how these concerns relate to those standardly discussed, but it pushes us to expand our conception of freedom.

中文翻译：

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上面的决定

许多历史上对自由的担忧在自由意志文学本身中已经不再被强调——例如，对政府暴政或资本主义异化的担忧。很难看出当前的自由意志文学如何尊重这些，或者实际上它们如何找到表达。本文试图展示如何通过诉诸层次本体论将这些问题和其他问题重新纳入辩论中。最近，克里斯蒂安·李斯特（Christian List）和其他人考虑了级别的概念如何与自由意志辩论相关。然而，焦点始终是较低层次事实的重要性。威胁来自底层，来自基础物理学或神经科学。在这里，我的目的是展示我们如何根据来自上方的威胁来构建有关自由意志的许多有趣的担忧。在论证了上面的决定同样具有威胁性之后，我列出了可能对我们的自由构成威胁的担忧。这样做不仅可以让我们展示这些担忧与标准讨论的问题之间的关系，而且还促使我们扩展我们的自由概念。