In this paper, I review arguments according to which harsh criminal punishments and poverty are undeserved and therefore unjust. Such arguments come in different forms. First, one may argue that no one deserves to be poor or be punished, because there is no such thing as desert-entailing moral responsibility. Second, one may argue that poor people in particular do not deserve to remain in poverty or to be punished if they commit crimes, because poor people suffer from psychological problems that undermine their agency and moral responsibility. Third, one may argue that poor and otherwise marginalized people frequently face external obstacles that prevent them from taking alternative courses of action. The first kind of argument has its place in the philosophy seminar. Psychological difficulties may be important to attend to both in personal relationships and when holding ourselves responsible. Nevertheless, I argue that neither type of argument belongs in political contexts. Moral responsibility scepticism ultimately rests on contested intuitions. Labelling certain groups of people particularly irrational, weak-willed, or similar is belittling and disrespectful; such claims are also hard to prove, and may have the opposite effect to the intended one on people's attitudes. Arguments from external obstacles have none of these problems. Such arguments may not take us all the way to criminal justice reform, but in this context, we can supplement them with epistemic arguments and crime prevention arguments.

中文翻译：

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代理和责任：个人和政治

在本文中，我回顾了一些观点，认为严厉的刑事处罚和贫困是不应有的，因此也是不公正的。这些论点有不同的形式。首先，有人可能会争辩说，没有人应该贫穷或受到惩罚，因为不存在所谓应得的道德责任。其次，有人可能会说，穷人尤其不应该继续处于贫困之中，也不应该因为犯罪而受到惩罚，因为穷人所遭受的心理问题损害了他们的能动性和道德责任。第三，有人可能会说，穷人和其他边缘化人群经常面临外部障碍，阻止他们采取其他行动方针。第一种论证在哲学研讨会上占有一席之地。无论是在人际关系中还是在承担责任时，处理心理困难可能都很重要。尽管如此，我认为这两种论点都不属于政治背景。道德责任怀疑论最终依赖于有争议的直觉。给某些群体贴上特别非理性、意志薄弱或类似的标签是贬低和不尊重的行为；这种说法也很难得到证实，并且可能对人们的态度产生与预期相反的效果。来自外部障碍的争论不存在这些问题。这些论点可能不会带我们一路走向刑事司法改革，但在这种背景下，我们可以用认识论论点和预防犯罪论点来补充它们。