How do emerging technologies affect nuclear stability? In this paper, we use a quasi-experimental cyber-nuclear wargame with 580 players to explore three hypotheses about emerging technologies and nuclear stability: (1) technological uncertainty leads to preemption and escalation; (2) technological uncertainty leads to restraint; and (3) technological certainty leads to escalation through aggressive counterforce campaigns. The wargames suggest that uncertainty and fear about cyber vulnerabilities create no immediate incentives for preemptive nuclear use. The greater danger to strategic stability lies in how overconfidence in cyber exploits incentivizes more aggressive counterforce campaigns and, secondarily, how vulnerabilities encourage predelegation or automation. Both of these effects suggest worrisome relationships between cyber exploits and inadvertent nuclear use on one hand and cyber vulnerabilities and accidental nuclear use on the other hand. Together, these findings reveal the complicated relationship between pathways to escalation and strategic stability, highlighting the role that confidence and perhaps-misplaced certainty—versus uncertainty and fear—play in strategic stability.

新兴技术如何影响核稳定性？在本文中，我们使用 580 名参与者的准实验性网络核兵棋推演来探讨有关新兴技术和核稳定性的三个假设：（1）技术不确定性导致先发制人和升级；（2）技术不确定性导致约束；(3) 技术确定性通过积极的反击行动导致局势升级。兵棋推演表明，对网络漏洞的不确定性和恐惧不会立即刺激先发制人的核使用。对战略稳定的更大危险在于，对网络利用的过度自信会激发更激进的反制行动，其次，漏洞会鼓励预授权或自动化。这两种影响都表明，一方面，网络利用与无意的核使用之间存在令人担忧的关系，另一方面，网络漏洞与意外核使用之间存在令人担忧的关系。总之，这些发现揭示了升级路径与战略稳定之间的复杂关系，凸显了信心和可能错位的确定性（相对于不确定性和恐惧）在战略稳定中发挥的作用。