ABSTRACT

Presidents have access to a range of resources unavailable to challengers, and often the most important are derived from control of the state. This allows incumbents to build more inclusive elite coalitions, distribute clientelist resources to their political base and co-opt opposition politicians. Cabinet and government appointments are some of the most visible, direct and identifiable indications of elite accommodation, and African presidents are more likely to build inclusive coalitions to ensure their survival. In Zambia, balanced regional representation – popularly known as “tribal balancing” – has held an important place in the public imagination. But between 2015 and 2021, rather than using incumbent advantage to build an ethnically inclusive alliance, President Lungu used cabinet appointments and senior government positions to shore up his base. This was bolstered by an exclusionary campaign that focused on the opposition leader’s ethnicity to push the PF’s base to vote against the opposition. This article uses an analysis of cabinet appointments and coverage of the election campaign to illustrate how Lungu sought to build an exclusionary coalition and exacerbate ethnic cleavages. This contributes to debates on when and why elites might use exclusionary strategies, and when they might fail to produce the desired outcome.

摘要

总统可以获得挑战者无法获得的一系列资源，而最重要的资源通常来自对国家的控制。这使得现任者能够建立更具包容性的精英联盟，将庇护资源分配给他们的政治基础，并拉拢反对派政客。内阁和政府任命是精英包容的一些最明显、最直接和最明显的迹象，非洲总统更有可能建立包容性联盟以确保其生存。在赞比亚，平衡的地区代表性——俗称“部落平衡”——在公众的想象中占有重要地位。但在2015年至2021年间，我们并没有利用现有优势建立一个种族包容的联盟，伦古总统利用内阁任命和高级政府职位来巩固他的基础。一场以反对派领导人的种族为重点的排他性运动推动了爱国阵线的基础选民投票反对反对派。本文通过对内阁任命和竞选报道的分析来说明伦古如何寻求建立排他性联盟并加剧种族分裂。这引发了关于精英何时以及为何可能使用排他性策略，以及何时可能无法产生预期结果的争论。本文通过对内阁任命和竞选报道的分析来说明伦古如何寻求建立排他性联盟并加剧种族分裂。这引发了关于精英何时以及为何会使用排他性策略，以及何时可能无法产生预期结果的争论。本文通过对内阁任命和竞选报道的分析来说明伦古如何寻求建立排他性联盟并加剧种族分裂。这引发了关于精英何时以及为何会使用排他性策略，以及何时可能无法产生预期结果的争论。