McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time was first published in the 1908 article “The Unreality of Time,” and a revised version appeared in the 1927 book The Nature of Existence. I argue that these two versions are significantly different. The second construction of the argument is important because it neutralizes a compelling objection. McTaggart’s initial argument tries to show that the conception of an A-series is self-contradictory. A natural objection is that the apparent contradiction can be resolved by making clear that an event has incompatible A-properties only successively. McTaggart anticipates and responds to the objection. My main contention is this: McTaggart’s initial response to the objection fails, but in the second construction of his argument he succeeds in showing that the contradiction cannot be resolved in the way suggested by the objection. I also explain why the second construction has been overlooked for so long.

中文翻译：

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麦克塔格特在 A 系列中被忽视的反对时间现实性论证的第二次构建

麦克塔格特关于时间不真实性的论点首次发表在 1908 年的文章《时间的不真实性》中，修订版出现在 1927 年的《存在的本质》一书中。我认为这两个版本有很大不同。论证的第二种结构很重要，因为它抵消了令人信服的反对意见。麦克塔格特最初的论点试图表明 A 系列的概念是自相矛盾的。一个自然的反对意见是，可以通过明确事件仅连续地具有不相容的 A 属性来解决明显的矛盾。麦克塔格特预见并回应了反对意见。我的主要论点是：麦克塔格特对反对意见的最初回应失败了，但在他的论点的第二种解释中，他成功地表明矛盾不能按照反对意见所建议的方式解决。我还解释了为什么第二个构造长期以来一直被忽视。