In this excellent book, Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion defend an etiological-functionalist account of the normativity of assertion. Specifically, the etiological function of assertion is to generate knowledge in hearers. Kelp and Simion argue that this functionalist thesis has two important implications: a) that epistemically good assertions are those that are disposed to generate knowledge in hearers, and b) that epistemically permissible assertions are those that conform to the Knowledge Rule of Assertion (KRA). One important feature of the book is a sophisticated defense of KRA by means of an etiological-functionalist framework.The book is lucidly written, rigorously argued, informed, and original. All of this is as expected, coming from two authors who have already made significant contributions to the topic. Indeed, the book draws on both their single-authored and coauthored work on related issues, including the normativity of assertion, the epistemology of testimony, epistemic norms, and epistemic normativity. The result is that an etiological-functionalist account of assertion is now front and center among competing views.The book also contains several other interesting and original discussions, all by way of applying the authors’ etiological-functionalist framework to prominent issues in the literature on assertion and beyond. These include a chapter on epistemic injustice (defending a duty to believe on the part of hearers), a chapter on whether there is a constitutive rule of assertion (rejecting Williamson’s strong constitution thesis, but defending a weaker version), a chapter on contextualism (arguing, contra DeRose, that KRA counts against a contextualist semantics of knowledge attributions), and an appendix on the value of knowledge (offering an original defense of our concern with knowledge, as well as a functionalist account of knowledge’s value). In my judgment, the book advances discussions on all of these topics in important and original ways.In the remainder of the review, I clarify what Kelp and Simion mean by a functionalist account of assertion, and I review what I take to be the authors’ most interesting arguments in favor of KRA and their etiological-functionalist account. I end by raising some questions about the view that results.Kelp and Simion tell us that they are arguing for a “function first” account of the normativity of assertion. Three points of clarifications are important here. First, this an account of the epistemic normativity of assertion, that is, an account of what makes an assertion epistemically (as opposed to practically, morally, or all-things-considered) good, proper, or right. Second, by “function,” the authors mean etiological function. This makes their account a competitor with ones that ground the normativity of assertion in human intentions (or what I will call the intended function of assertion). For example, it is a competitor with accounts that ground the normativity of assertion in human intentions embedded in speech acts or in other social practices or norms. Putting these two points together, Kelp and Simion are arguing for an etiological account of the epistemic normativity of assertion.Third, Kelp and Simion think that the normativity of assertion is multidimensional in the following way: there is a distinction between an assertion’s being good (or valuable) and its being permissible. As such, they argue, an adequate account of the normativity of assertion must address both of these dimensions. Specifically, rules of assertion such as KRA address the epistemic permissibility question. KRA says one must (epistemically) assert p only if one knows p. Alternatively, it is (epistemically) permissible to assert p only if one knows p. But this leaves open the question of the goodness of assertion—what makes an assertion epistemically good or valuable. Their function first account primarily answers this second question about goodness, and then derives an answer to the permissibility question from that. In turn, they argue, alternative accounts tend to conflate the distinction between these two dimensions for normativity, either assuming that good assertions must be permissible assertions or missing the distinction altogether.Regarding the epistemic permissibility of assertion, Kelp and Simion defend KRA in two stages. In the first stage, which comprises part 1 of the book, they look at the main arguments for and against KRA in the literature. Here they introduce a piece of theoretical machinery—their “Basic Normative Framework”—that I think moves discussion forward. In particular, a number of objections to KRA take the form of an apparent counterexample: a person S asserts p in a case where a) S does not know p, and yet b) S’s assertion seems permissible nonetheless. A common move by defenders of KRA is to interpret the case as a blameless norm violation. For example, KRA is indeed governing S’s assertion and violated, but S has an excuse. Objectors to KRA complain that this kind of move is ad hoc, inappropriately insulating KRA from apparent counterexamples. In the context of this dialectic, Kelp and Simion introduce an independently plausible framework for understanding criticism and blame, and they then show how the framework predicts patterns of criticism, apology, explanation, and excuse that favor KRA over other accounts. The Basic Normative Framework and the discussion around its application are too complex to present here. I will only register my agreement with Kelp and Simion on two central points: a) that their Basic Normative Framework is independently plausible and b) that it speaks decisively in favor of KRA in terms of how it predicts relevant conversational patterns.The second stage of KRA’s defense takes place in part 2 of the book, in the context of a broader defense of Kelp and Simion’s etiological-functionalist framework. Specifically, chapter 4 articulates and defends a functionalist account of the goodness of assertion. Roughly, one’s assertion is (epistemically) good just in case it has the disposition to generate knowledge in one’s hearers. Chapter 5 then shows how KRA, which speaks to the permissibility of assertion, can be derived from the account in chapter 4. The arguments of both chapters are central to the purposes of the book, and are of independent interest as well.The burden of chapter 4 is to establish the following evaluative norm:The argument begins by endorsing a standard account of etiological function:Kelp and Simon introduce some additional theoretical machinery that complicates the standard account and is employed to argue for their Evaluative Norm of Assertion. Specifically, a “simple economic system (SES)” is one that is constituted by a type of producer, a type of product, a type of consumer, and a type of return. For example, consider the practice of producing and consuming espresso at a local coffee shop (SES-Espresso). In SES-Espresso, baristas (producers) produce cups of espresso (product), which are consumed by customers (consumers) by means of a purchase (return). By E-function, tokens of espresso have the e-function of producing pleasant gustatory experiences in customers in SES-Espresso.Next, Kelp and Simion defend the following general evaluative norm:By this general evaluative norm, cups of espresso that have the disposition to produce pleasant gustatory experiences are good cups of espresso.The next step of the argument is to apply this machinery to assertions. Specifically, Kelp and Simion argue that our practice of making assertions qualifies as a simple economic system. In SES-Assertion, speakers (producers) produce assertions (products), which are consumed by hearers (consumers) by means of belief (return). By E-function, assertions have the e-function of generating knowledge in hearers. Finally, by means of the general evaluative norm for tokens with an e-function, we get The Evaluative Norm of Assertion.The task of chapter 5 is to provide a functionalist rationale for KRA, that is, to explain from a functionalist perspective why KRA should govern the permissibility of assertion. Kelp and Simion begin by describing a kind of situation where it makes sense to govern e-tokens by some rule or other. This is a situation where a) it matters that tokens of the type fulfill their e-function reliably (Reliability), b) there are numerous possible ways of producing tokens of the type, with varying reliability regarding whether tokens so produced fulfill their e-function (Variation), and c) tokens of the type are produced by human agents who are criticism-averse (Humanity). In such a situation, Kelp and Simion argue, it makes sense to govern the production of tokens by means of rules that promote reliability regarding e-function fulfillment. Moreover, they argue, SES-Assertion satisfies these conditions, so it makes sense that assertions should be governed by such a rule. The next step of the argument is to show that assertions should be governed by KRA in particular. That is, to show that governing assertions by KRA promotes the reliability with which assertions generate knowledge in hearers. Kelp and Simion offer several reasons for supposing that it does, thereby vindicating KRA from a functionalist perspective.First, why do Kelp and Simion think that the function of assertion is to generate knowledge rather than transmit it? The question arises because, on their own account, “cases in which testimony transmits knowledge predominate and cases in which testimony generates knowledge are rare exceptions” (114). But if generation cases are rare, it is unclear how assertions can have “the disposition to generate knowledge that p in one’s hearer(s) … by functioning normally in normal conditions.” (See the Evaluative Norm of Assertion, above). It is also unclear how knowledge generation “contributes to the explanation of why” assertions exist in SES-Assertion. (See E-function, above.) By their own reasoning, then, Kelp and Simion should think that the function of assertion is to transmit knowledge and that it is the disposition to fulfill this function that makes a token assertion good.Second, is FFAA supposed to give a full account or a partial account of the epistemic goodness of assertion? If it is supposed to give a full account, then FFAA is implausible. That is because assertions plausibly have an intended function as well as an etiological function, and it is plausible that intended function fulfillment also contributes to assertion’s epistemic goodness. For example, various authors have argued that the speech act of assertion is constituted by the intention to transmit knowledge, to give a reason to believe, or to give license to believe. If so, then it is plausible that the epistemic goodness of assertions is at least partly a matter of fulfilling their intended epistemic function. Suppose, then, that FFAA is supposed to give only a partial account of the epistemic goodness of assertion. In that case, it is unclear why FAA is a competitor to “intended function” accounts, including those that ground the goodness of assertion in the epistemic intentions embedded in constitutive rules, linguistic norms, or other social norms governing the practice of assertion.Suppose Kelp and Simion were to revise their view so as to accommodate these concerns. Many of their arguments and much of their view would be left intact, including their functionalist defense of KRA. And we would still have a compelling (now partial) account of the goodness of assertion, in terms of assertion’s etiological function of transmitting knowledge.

中文翻译：

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分享知识：断言的功能主义解释

在这本优秀的书中，Christoph Kelp 和 Mona Simion 捍卫了对断言规范性的病因功能主义解释。具体来说，断言的病因学功能是在听众中产生知识。Kelp 和 Simion 认为这个功能主义论点有两个重要的含义：a) 认知上好的断言是那些倾向于在听众中产生知识的断言，以及 b) 认知上允许的断言是那些符合知识断言规则 (KRA) 的断言. 这本书的一个重要特点是通过病因功能主义框架对 KRA 进行了复杂的辩护。这本书写得很清楚，论据严谨，内容丰富，而且是原创的。所有这些都符合预期，来自两位已经对该主题做出重大贡献的作者。的确，这本书借鉴了他们在相关问题上的独着和合着作品，包括断言的规范性、证词的认识论、认识规范和认识规范性。结果是，对断言的病因功能主义解释现在成为竞争观点的前沿和中心。这本书还包含其他几个有趣和原创的讨论，所有这些都是通过将作者的病因功能主义框架应用于文献中的突出问题断言和超越。其中包括关于认知不公正的一章（捍卫听众相信的义务），关于是否存在断言的构成规则的一章（拒绝威廉姆森的强宪法论点，但捍卫较弱的版本），关于语境主义的一章（争论，反对 DeRose，KRA 反对知识属性的语境主义语义）和关于知识价值的附录（为我们对知识的关注提供原始辩护，以及对知识价值的功能主义解释）。在我看来，这本书以重要和原创的方式推进了所有这些主题的讨论。在评论的其余部分，我阐明了 Kelp 和 Simion 对断言的功能主义解释的含义，并回顾了我认为的作者' 支持 KRA 及其病因功能主义解释的最有趣的论点。最后，我对结果的观点提出了一些问题。Kelp 和 Simion 告诉我们，他们正在争论对断言规范性的“功能优先”解释。这里有三点澄清很重要。第一的，这是对断言的认知规范性的解释，也就是说，是对什么使断言在认知上（相对于实践、道德或综合考虑）好的、适当或正确的解释。其次，作者所说的“功能”是指病因功能。这使得他们的解释与那些将断言的规范性建立在人类意图（或我将称之为断言的预期功能）上的解释相竞争。例如，它是一个竞争对手，其帐户将断言的规范性置于言语行为或其他社会实践或规范中的人类意图中。将这两点放在一起，Kelp 和 Simion 正在争论对断言的认知规范性的病因学解释。第三，Kelp 和 Simion 认为断言的规范性是多维的，如下所示：一个断言是好的（或有价值的）和它是被允许的是有区别的。因此，他们认为，对断言的规范性的充分说明必须解决这两个方面。具体来说，诸如 KRA 之类的断言规则解决了认知允许性问题。KRA 说，只有当一个人知道 p 时，他才必须（从认知上）断言 p。或者，只有当一个人知道 p 时，才（在认知上）允许断言 p。但这留下了断言的优点的问题——什么使断言在认知上是好的或有价值的。他们的函数首先说明主要回答关于善的第二个问题，然后从中得出对可允许性问题的答案。反过来，他们认为，替代性的解释往往会混淆规范性的这两个维度之间的区别，要么假设好的断言必须是可允许的断言，要么完全忽略区别。关于断言的认知可允许性，Kelp 和 Simion 分两个阶段为 KRA 辩护。在第一阶段，也就是本书的第 1 部分，他们研究了文献中支持和反对 KRA 的主要论点。在这里，他们介绍了一种理论机制——他们的“基本规范框架”——我认为这会推动讨论向前发展。特别是，许多对 KRA 的反对采取明显反例的形式：在 a) S 不知道 p 的情况下，一个人 S 断言 p，但 b) S 的断言似乎仍然是允许的。KRA 捍卫者的一个常见举动是将此案解释为无可指责的规范违规行为。例如，KRA确实管辖S的断言并违反了，但S有借口。KRA 的反对者抱怨说，这种举动是临时的，不适当地将 KRA 与明显的反例隔离开来。在这种辩证法的背景下，Kelp 和 Simion 引入了一个独立合理的框架来理解批评和责备，然后他们展示了该框架如何预测批评、道歉、解释和辩解的模式，这些模式比其他说法更有利于 KRA。基本规范框架及其应用的讨论过于复杂，无法在此展示。我只会在两个中心点上与 Kelp 和 Simion 达成一致：a) 他们的基本规范框架是独立合理的，b) 它在如何预测相关对话模式方面果断地支持 KRA。 第二阶段KRA 的辩护发生在本书的第 2 部分，在更广泛地捍卫 Kelp 和 Simion 的病因功能主义框架的背景下。具体而言，第 4 章阐明并捍卫了功能主义对断言优点的解释。粗略地说，一个人的断言（在认知上）是好的，以防它有在听众中产生知识的倾向。然后，第 5 章展示了如何从第 4 章中的说明中推导出关于断言的可允许性的 KRA。这两章的论点都是本书目的的核心，也是独立的兴趣点。第 4 章是建立以下评价规范：论证首先支持对病因功能的标准说明：Kelp 和 Simon 介绍了一些额外的理论机制，这些机制使标准解释变得复杂，并被用来争论他们的断言评估规范。具体来说，“简单经济系统（SES）”是由一种生产者、一种产品、一种消费者和一种回报构成的。例如，考虑在当地咖啡店 (SES-Espresso) 生产和消费浓缩咖啡的做法。在 SES-Espresso 中，咖啡师（生产商）生产咖啡杯（产品），客户（消费者）通过购买（退货）的方式消费这些咖啡。通过 E-function，espresso 的代币具有在 SES-Espresso 中为顾客产生愉快味觉体验的 e-function。接下来，Kelp 和 Simion 捍卫了以下一般评价规范：通过这个一般评价规范，能够产生愉快味觉体验的浓缩咖啡杯是好杯浓缩咖啡。论证的下一步是将这种机制应用于断言。具体来说，Kelp 和 Simion 认为，我们做出断言的做法可以作为一个简单的经济系统。在SES-Assertion中，说话者（生产者）产生断言（产品），通过信念（返回）被听者（消费者）消费。通过电子功能，断言具有在听众中产生知识的电子功能。最后，借助于具有e函数的记号的一般评价范数，我们得到断言的评价范数。第五章的任务是为KRA提供一个功能主义的理论基础，即从功能主义的角度解释为什么KRA应该支配断言的允许性。Kelp 和 Simion 首先描述了一种情况，在这种情况下，通过某种规则或其他规则来管理电子代币是有意义的。在这种情况下，a) 类型的代币可靠地实现其 e-function（可靠性）很重要，b）有多种可能的方式来生成该类型的代币，对于如此生成的代币是否实现其 e- 具有不同的可靠性函数（变体），以及 c) 类型的标记是由厌恶批评的人类代理人（人性）产生的。在这种情况下，Kelp 和 Simion 认为，通过促进电子功能实现可靠性的规则来管理代币的生产是有意义的。此外，他们认为，SES-Assertion 满足这些条件，因此断言应受此类规则约束是有道理的。论证的下一步是表明断言尤其应受 KRA 管辖。也就是说，表明由 KRA 支配的断言提高了断言在听众中产生知识的可靠性。Kelp 和 Simion 提供了几个假设它确实如此的理由，从而从功能主义的角度为 KRA 辩护。首先，为什么 Kelp 和 Simion 认为断言的功能是产生知识而不是传播知识？出现这个问题是因为，就他们自己而言，“证词传递知识的案例占主导地位，而证词产生知识的案例很少见”（114）。但是，如果生成案例很少见，则尚不清楚断言如何具有“在一个人的听众中生成知识 p 的倾向……通过在正常条件下正常运作。”（见上文断言的评估规范）。还不清楚知识生成如何“有助于解释为什么”断言存在于 SES-Assertion 中。（参见上面的 E-function。）然后，根据他们自己的推理，Kelp 和 Simion 应该认为断言的功能是传递知识，而实现这一功能的倾向使令牌断言变得更好。其次，是FFAA 应该完整说明还是部分说明断言的认知优点？如果要给出一个完整的帐户，那么 FFAA 是难以置信的。这是因为断言似乎具有预期功能和病因学功能，而且预期功能的实现也有助于断言的认知善性，这似乎是合理的。例如，许多作者认为，断言的言语行为是由传播知识、给出相信的理由或允许相信的意图构成的。如果是这样，那么断言的认知善至少部分是实现其预期的认知功能的问题是有道理的。那么，假设 FFAA 应该只给出断言的认知善的部分说明。在那种情况下，不清楚为什么 FAA 是“预期功能”帐户的竞争者，包括那些将断言的优点建立在构成规则、语言规范或其他管理断言实践的社会规范的认知意图中的人。假设Kelp 和 Simion 将修改他们的观点以适应这些担忧。他们的许多论点和观点将保持原样，包括他们对 KRA 的功能主义辩护。根据断言传播知识的病因学功能，我们仍然会对断言的好处有一个令人信服的（现在是部分的）解释。