Perception solves computationally demanding problems at lightning fast speed. It recovers sophisticated representations of the world from degraded inputs, often in a matter of milliseconds. Any theory of perception must be able to explain how this is possible; in other words, it must be able to explain perception’s computational tractability. One of the few attempts to move toward such an explanation is the information encapsulation hypothesis, which posits that perception can be fast because it keeps computational costs low by forgoing access to information stored in cognition. I argue that we have no compelling reason to believe that encapsulation explains (or even contributes to an explanation of) perceptual tractability, and much reason to doubt it. This is because there exist much deeper computational challenges for perception than information access, and these threaten to make the costs of access irrelevant. If this is right, it undermines a core computational motivation for encapsulation and sends us back to the drawing board for explanations of perceptual tractability.

中文翻译：

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感知如何易于处理？

Perception 以闪电般的速度解决计算要求高的问题。它可以从退化的输入中恢复复杂的世界表征，通常只需几毫秒。任何知觉理论都必须能够解释这是如何可能的；换句话说，它必须能够解释感知的计算易处理性. 信息封装假说是为数不多的朝着这种解释迈进的尝试之一，该假说认为感知可以很快，因为它通过放弃对存储在认知中的信息的访问来保持较低的计算成本。我认为，我们没有令人信服的理由相信封装可以解释（或什至有助于解释）感知易处理性，并且有很多理由怀疑它。这是因为与信息访问相比，感知存在更深层次的计算挑战，而这些挑战可能会使访问成本变得无关紧要。如果这是正确的，它会破坏封装的核心计算动机，并将我们送回绘图板以解释感知易处理性。