Michael Tye is perhaps best known for his defense of tracking representationalism, a view that combines representationalism (the view that an experience’s phenomenal character is determined by its representational content) with a tracking theory of representation (the view that mental representation is a matter of causal covariation, carrying information, or, more generally, tracking). In Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness, Tye takes an unexpected turn, endorsing a combination of tracking representationalism and panpsychism, which is understood here as the view that phenomenal consciousness is a primitive feature of the fundamental constituents of reality. While Tye takes both panpsychism and tracking representationalism to fail as theories of consciousness, he argues that their combination—-panpsychist representationalism—-can avoid the problems of both.Chapter 1 of Tye’s book frames the discussion in terms of the problem of vagueness for materialist theories of consciousness (theories that identify or ground consciousness in physical or functional properties). The problem is that the properties that materialist theories identify consciousness with (or ground consciousness in) are vague in that they admit borderline cases.1 For example, functional properties are vague since there are borderline cases in which it is indeterminate whether something plays the relevant role. Since materialism identifies consciousness with (or grounds it in) vague properties, it is committed to the vagueness of consciousness. The problem is that it is not vague whether something is conscious. In brief, assuming consciousness exists, it seems we are forced to reject one of these two claims, both of which are highly plausible according to Tye: (1) Materialism is true of consciousness.(2) Consciousness is sharp (i.e., not vague).Chapter 2 considers a possible resolution of the problem that rejects neither materialism nor the sharpness of consciousness: Russellian monist panpsychism (or panpsychism for short), the view that consciousness is the intrinsic, categorical nature of the physical. This broadly materialist view appears to avoid vagueness by taking all fundamental entities to be determinately conscious.Tye rejects panpsychism, citing several well-known problems. The main problems center around panpsychism’s alleged inability to offer an intelligible explanation of nonfundamental conscious experiences (such as, presumably, our conscious experiences), where an intelligible explanation of A in terms of B is one in which B a priori entails A. It seems that the facts about fundamental instances of consciousness, even in combination with the causal dispositional facts that define our internal organization and relationships to the environment, do not a priori entail that there are nonfundamental experiences like ours.Tye also claims that, aside from panpsychism’s internal difficulties, the view does not actually help with the problem of vagueness: the panpsychist identifies nonfundamental experiences with fundamental experiences organized in particular ways, but the relevant organizational properties are vague, so the theory predicts borderline cases of consciousness (29). So, it is not in fact compatible with the sharpness of consciousness.Chapter 3 switches gears to provide a defense of representationalism and the argument from transparency, overviewing well-worn discussions. Tye defends a version of representationalism, property representationalism, on which the phenomenal character of an experience is determined by the properties it represents. He combines this representationalism with a tracking theory of mental representation, on which representation is a matter of causally indicating, having the function of indicating, or otherwise tracking something. For example, on Tye’s tracking representationalism, an experience with a reddish phenomenal character is an experience that tracks redness. While Tye defends tracking representationalism, he is aware that the view faces a vagueness problem: since it is vague whether an internal state tracks something, the view is incompatible with the sharpness of consciousness.Chapter 4 presents Tye’s positive proposal, which is a combination of panpsychism and representationalism. According to this panpsychist representationalism, fundamental entities have consciousness*, which is mere consciousness (consciousness without any particular phenomenal character). There is something it is like to be a fundamental entity, though there is nothing in particular that it is like to be it.When fundamental entities “are arranged so as to form states that play the sort of role assigned to conscious states in GWT [global workspace theory]” (88), they form nonfundamental entities that are conscious*. Thus, like traditional panpsychism, representationalist panpsychism is committed to fundamental consciousness-related features combining to form nonfundamental consciousness-related features.Consciousness* is distinct from consciousness, which Tye (at this point in the book) takes to be the having of particular phenomenal characters. When conscious* states play the roles specified by GWT, which include that of tracking worldly properties, they thereby have the tracked properties as part of their phenomenal characters. For example, a conscious state with a reddish phenomenal character is a conscious* state that plays the roles specified by GWT and tracks the property of redness.Tye claims that this view solves the problem of vagueness: it is a materialist view that is compatible with the sharpness of consciousness*. The view, though, is incompatible with the sharpness of consciousness, since consciousness requires tracking and tracking is vague. Tye explains away our intuition that consciousness is sharp by claiming that the sharpness of consciousness* misleads us into thinking that consciousness is sharp (79).The book concludes with a chapter on the neurobiology of consciousness, reviewing some empirical hypotheses regarding the location of consciousness in the brain and applying panpsychist representationalism to determine which life forms are conscious.While Tye’s version of panpsychism differs from traditional versions, intelligibility problems remain. For one, Tye fails to intelligibly explain how the consciousness* of fundamental entities “transfers” (88) to nonfundamental entities. He takes this to be a matter of how fundamental entities are arranged so as to play the roles of GWT, but it is unclear how any kind of functional arrangement of conscious* fundamental entities can account for nonfundamental consciousness*. This is a straightforward instance of panpsychism’s combination problem.Tye also fails to intelligibly explain the having of particular phenomenal characters. He takes conscious states with specific phenomenal characters to be nonfundamental conscious* states that track worldly properties, but there is no intelligible explanation of why a nonfundamental conscious* state’s tracking a particular worldly property should result in a conscious state with a particular phenomenal character.2Tye’s solution to the problem of vagueness involves claiming that (1) consciousness* is sharp even though (2) consciousness is vague and that (3) the appearance of a dilemma arises because we mistakenly attribute the sharpness of consciousness* to our consciousness. There are problems with all three claims.Regarding (1), one might worry that although Tye’s view allows that the consciousness* of fundamental entities is sharp, it does not allow the consciousness* of nonfundamental entities to be sharp. This is because it takes nonfundamental entities to be conscious* when conscious* fundamental entities “are arranged so as to form states that play the sort of role assigned to conscious states in GWT” (88) but the property of being thus arranged is vague.3Claim (2) also seems questionable. Tye argues that there can be borderline cases of having a particular phenomenal character, such as a borderline case of pain (13–14). We agree that the term “pain” is vague and that, if we accept that corresponding to vague terms there are vague properties, the property of having a pain is vague, too. However, it seems clear that whatever we call the above-mentioned indeterminate pain state, it has a sharp phenomenal property, Q: there is a specific, fully determinate way that it feels. Indeed, Q is plausibly more fundamental than any vague phenomenal properties the state has in that the state instantiates any such vague phenomenal properties in virtue of having Q. Even if it is right to say that there are vague phenomenal properties, there are also sharp phenomenal properties, and Tye’s view cannot accommodate them.Claim (3) states that the appearance of a dilemma arises because we mistakenly attribute the sharpness of consciousness* to our consciousness. But if the objection to (1) is correct, then on Tye’s view, our own consciousness* is not sharp. So, we do not have any observable sharp consciousness-like properties with which to conflate our allegedly vague consciousness (and surely we are not conflating the sharp consciousness* of quarks with our own consciousness!). The objection to (2) also makes (3) implausible because it offers a principled reason for thinking that some macroscopic conscious properties are sharp. As far as consciousness as we know it is concerned, the dilemma is unresolved.To generate a dilemma, materialism must be committed to consciousness being vague. But, one might suggest, materialism is not thus committed. While many existing materialist theories invoke vague physical or functional properties, these theories can be precisified to instead invoke sharp physical or functional properties. For example, instead of identifying consciousness with neural oscillations with a frequency of roughly 40 hertz (Crick and Koch’s “astonishing hypothesis”), the materialist could identify consciousness with neural oscillations at exactly 39.12409825–40.185282624 hertz (call this the sharpened astonishing hypothesis; of course, the term “neural” also needs a similar precisification. If such views are available, then there is not even a prima facie incompatibility between materialism and the sharpness of consciousness.Tye briefly considers something like this precisification strategy on behalf of the nonreductive materialist, who takes consciousness to be grounded in (but not identical to) physical or functional features. Tye rejects the resulting view, citing explanatory challenges. The interesting problem for our purposes is that such views cannot explain why one physical/functional state grounds consciousness while another nearby one does not (10–11).4We certainly agree that precisified materialist theories face a challenge in explaining consciousness. But this does not affect the point that the availability of such precisifications means that materialism is not in fact committed to the vagueness of consciousness. Instead, materialism is, at best, committed to accepting that consciousness and its constituting physical/functional features are either both sharp or both vague.Assuming, along with Tye (at the beginning of the book), that consciousness is sharp, the materialist is forced to take consciousness to be a matter of sharp physical or functional properties. This is where the problems for materialism really get started. As we have seen, such a view faces an explanatory worry: why should one physical/functional state give rise to consciousness but not another? This worry is related to well-known explanatory-gap style worries in that if the explanatory gap could be bridged, these worries would dissolve: if there was an intelligible explanation for why a precise physical/functional feature gives rise to consciousness and no such explanation for nearby physical/functional features, there would be no further question of the sort raised by Tye.However, we think Tye is onto something in claiming that precisified versions of materialism face special challenges. Precisified theories face an additional “structural mismatch” worry: they imply that some tiny physical differences make large phenomenal differences (i.e., that some apparently large differences are small or vice versa). Of course, a posteriori physicalists have a response at hand: there is only one difference, and any impression to the contrary is an illusion. It seems to us, however, that the need to posit cognitive illusions to explain away such an apparent structural mismatch is a significant cost above and beyond what posteriori physicalists already accept.In short, the materialist has an obvious way to dissolve Tye’s dilemma: the precisification strategy. But this strategy does not come without problems, which would be interesting to explore.We recommend Tye’s Vagueness and the Evolution of Consciousness to anyone interested in representationalism, panpsychism, or challenges to materialism arising from vagueness. While we are not convinced that the book succeeds in solving the problems it sets out to solve or that it correctly construes materialism’s troubles in this area, it raises important questions and makes headway in charting the prospects of combining panpsychism with views about the relationship between consciousness and intentionality, which is an interesting and, we think, promising area for future research.

中文翻译：

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模糊与意识的进化

Michael Tye 最著名的也许是他对跟踪表征主义的辩护，这种观点将表征主义（一种经验的现象特征由其表征内容决定的观点）与表征跟踪理论（认为心理表征是因果关系的观点）结合起来协变、携带信息，或者更一般地说，跟踪）。在《模糊与意识的进化》一书中，Tye 出人意料地转向，支持追踪表征主义和泛心论的结合，这里将其理解为现象意识是现实基本构成的原始特征的观点。虽然 Tye 将泛心论和追踪表征论都视为意识理论的失败，他认为他们的结合——泛心论的表征主义——可以避免这两者的问题。Tye 的书的第 1 章根据唯物主义意识理论的模糊性问题（在物理或功能特性中识别或建立意识的理论）来构建讨论框架). 问题在于，唯物主义理论将意识（或基础意识）等同于的属性是模糊的，因为它们承认边界情况。角色。由于唯物主义将意识等同于（或以）模糊的属性为基础，因此它致力于意识的模糊性。问题是某物是否有意识并不模糊。简单来说，假设意识存在，我们似乎不得不拒绝这两个主张中的一个，根据 Tye 的说法，这两个主张都是非常合理的：（1）唯物主义对意识是正确的。（2）意识是敏锐的（即不模糊）。 2 考虑了一个既不拒绝唯物主义也不拒绝意识敏锐度的问题的可能解决方案：罗素式一元论泛心论（或简称泛心论），认为意识是物理的内在的、绝对的本质。这种广义的唯物主义观点似乎通过将所有基本实体都视为明确意识来避免含糊不清。Tye 拒绝泛心论，列举了几个众所周知的问题。主要问题集中在泛心论据称无法对非基本意识体验（例如，大概是，我们的意识体验），其中根据 B 对 A 的可理解解释是 B 先验地蕴含 A。似乎关于意识的基本实例的事实，甚至与定义我们内部组织的因果倾向事实相结合，与环境的关系，不要先验地推导出像我们这样的非基本体验。Tye 还声称，除了泛心论的内部困难之外，该观点实际上并没有帮助解决模糊性问题：泛心论者将非基本体验与组织起来的基本体验联系起来以特定的方式，但相关的组织属性是模糊的，因此该理论预测了意识的边界情况 (29)。因此，它实际上与意识的敏锐度不相容。第 3 章切换方向，为代表性主义和透明度论证提供辩护，概述陈旧的讨论。Tye 捍卫了表征主义的一个版本，即财产表征主义，在该版本上，体验的现象特征由它所代表的属性决定。他将这种表征主义与心理表征的追踪理论相结合，表征是一种因果指示，具有指示功能或以其他方式追踪某物。例如，在 Tye 的追踪表征主义中，具有红色现象特征的体验是追踪红色的体验。虽然 Tye 为跟踪表征主义辩护，但他意识到该观点面临一个模糊性问题：由于内部状态是否跟踪某些东西是模糊的，这种观点与敏锐的意识是不相容的。第四章介绍了泰伊的积极主张，它是泛心论和表征主义的结合。根据这种泛心论的表征主义，基本实体具有意识*，这仅仅是意识（没有任何特殊现象特征的意识）。成为一个基本实体有点像，尽管没有什么特别喜欢成为它。全球工作空间理论]”（88），它们形成了有意识的非基本实体*。因此，就像传统的泛心论一样，表征主义的泛心论致力于将与意识相关的基本特征结合起来，形成与意识相关的非基本特征。意识*不同于意识，Tye（在本书的这一点上）认为意识具有特定的现象特征。当有意识*状态扮演 GWT 指定的角色时，包括跟踪世俗属性的角色，它们因此将被跟踪的属性作为其现象特征的一部分。例如，具有红色现象特征的意识状态是扮演 GWT 指定角色并追踪红色属性的意识*状态。Tye 声称这种观点解决了模糊性问题：它是一种唯物主义观点，与意识的敏锐度*。观点，虽然，与意识的敏锐度不相容，因为意识需要追踪，而追踪是模糊的。Tye 通过声称意识的敏锐性 * 误导我们认为意识是敏锐的来解释我们认为意识是敏锐的直觉 (79)。这本书以关于意识的神经生物学的一章结尾，回顾了一些关于意识位置的经验假设在大脑中并应用泛心论表征来确定哪些生命形式是有意识的。虽然 Tye 的泛心论版本与传统版本不同，但仍然存在可理解性问题。一方面，Tye 未能清楚地解释基本实体的意识*如何“转移”(88) 到非基本实体。他认为这是一个关于如何安排基本实体以扮演 GWT 角色的问题，但不清楚意识*基本实体的任何一种功能安排如何解释非基本意识*。这是泛心论组合问题的一个直接例子。Tye 也未能清楚地解释特定现象特征的具有。他将具有特定现象特征的意识状态视为追踪世俗属性的非基本意识*状态，但没有可理解的解释为什么非基本意识*状态追踪特定世俗属性会导致具有特定现象特征的意识状态。2Tye 对模糊问题的解决方案包括声称 (1) 意识*是敏锐的，尽管 (2) 意识是模糊的，并且 (3) 进退两难的出现是因为我们错误地将意识*的敏锐归因于我们的意识。这三个说法都有问题。关于（1），有人可能会担心，虽然泰伊的观点允许基本实体的意识*是敏锐的，但它不允许非基本实体的意识*是敏锐的。这是因为当有意识的*基本实体“被安排以形成在 GWT 中扮演分配给意识状态的角色的状态”时，它需要非基本实体是有意识的*（88），但如此安排的属性是模糊的。 3 声明（2）似乎也有问题。Tye 认为，可能存在具有特定现象特征的边缘案例，例如疼痛的边缘案例 (13–14)。我们同意术语“疼痛”是模糊的，如果我们接受对应于模糊术语的模糊属性，那么感到疼痛的属性也是模糊的。然而，似乎很清楚，无论我们如何称呼上述不确定的疼痛状态，它都有一个尖锐的现象特性，Q：它有一种特定的、完全确定的感觉方式。事实上，Q 似乎比状态具有的任何模糊现象属性更基本，因为状态凭借具有 Q 来实例化任何此类模糊现象属性。即使说存在模糊现象属性是正确的，也存在尖锐的现象属性属性，而 Tye 的视图无法容纳它们。主张 (3) 指出，进退两难的出现是因为我们错误地将意识的敏锐度*归因于我们的意识。但如果对 (1) 的反对是正确的，那么在 Tye 看来，我们自己的意识*并不敏锐。因此，我们没有任何可观察到的类似敏锐意识的特性，可以将我们所谓的模糊意识与之混为一谈（而且我们肯定不会将夸克的敏锐意识*与我们自己的意识混为一谈！）。对 (2) 的反对也使 (3) 变得难以置信，因为它提供了一个原则性的理由来认为某些宏观意识属性是敏锐的。就我们所知的意识而言，这个困境是没有解决的。要产生一个困境，唯物主义必须致力于意识是模糊的。但是，有人可能会建议，唯物主义并非如此坚定。虽然许多现有的唯物主义理论引用了模糊的物理或功能特性，但这些理论可以被精确化以代替调用清晰的物理或功能特性。例如，不是用大约 40 赫兹的频率识别意识（克里克和科赫的“惊人假设”），唯物主义者可以用恰好 39.12409825–40.185282624 赫兹的神经振荡识别意识（称之为尖锐的惊人假设；当然，“神经”一词也需要类似的精确化。如果有这样的观点，那么唯物主义和意识的敏锐度之间甚至没有表面上的不相容。Tye代表非还原唯物主义者简要考虑了类似这种精确化策略, 谁认为意识植根于（但不等同于）身体或功能特征。Tye 以解释性挑战为由拒绝了由此产生的观点。就我们的目的而言，有趣的问题是，这样的观点无法解释为什么一种身体/功能状态是意识的基础，而另一种邻近的状态却不是 (10-11)。4我们当然同意，精确的唯物主义理论在解释意识方面面临挑战。但这并不影响这一点，即这种精确化的可用性意味着唯物主义实际上并不致力于意识的模糊性。相反，唯物主义充其量是致力于接受意识及其构成的物理/功能特征要么都是敏锐的，要么都是模糊的。与 Tye（在本书开头）一起假设意识是敏锐的，唯物主义者被迫将意识视为具有尖锐物理或功能特性的问题。这就是唯物主义问题真正开始的地方。正如我们所见，这样的观点面临着一个解释性的担忧：为什么一种身体/功能状态应该产生意识而不是另一种？这种担忧与众所周知的解释性差距式担忧有关，因为如果可以弥合解释性差距，这些担忧就会消失：如果有一个可理解的解释来解释为什么精确的身体/功能特征会产生意识，而没有这样的解释对于附近的物理/功能特征，不会再有 Tye 提出的那种问题。但是，我们认为 Tye 声称唯物主义的精确版本面临特殊挑战是有道理的。精确理论面临着额外的“结构不匹配”担忧：它们意味着一些微小的物理差异会产生巨大的现象差异（即，一些明显的大差异实际上很小，反之亦然）。当然，后验物理学家有一个回应：只有一个区别，任何相反的印象都是错觉。然而，在我们看来，需要假设认知错觉来解释这种明显的结构不匹配是一个巨大的成本，超出了后验物理主义者已经接受的范围。简而言之，唯物主义者有一个明显的方法来解决 Tye 的困境：精准化策略 但这种策略并非没有问题，探索起来会很有趣。我们向任何对表征主义、泛心论或因模糊而挑战唯物主义感兴趣的人推荐 Tye 的《模糊与意识的进化》。虽然我们不相信这本书成功地解决了它打算解决的问题，或者它正确地解释了唯物主义在这个领域的麻烦，但它提出了重要的问题，并在描绘将泛心论与意识之间关系的观点相结合的前景方面取得了进展。和意向性，这是一个有趣的，我们认为，未来研究的有前途的领域。