In recent years, several philosophers have argued that their discipline makes no progress (or not enough in comparison to the “hard sciences”). A key argument for this pessimistic position appeals to the purported fact that philosophers widely and systematically disagree on most major philosophical issues. In this paper, we take a step back from the debate about progress in philosophy specifically and consider the general question: How (if at all) would disagreement within a discipline undermine that discipline’s progress? We reject two arguments from disagreement to a lack of progress, and spell out two accounts of progress on which progress is compatible with disagreements that persist or increase over time. However, we also argue that disagreement can undermine our ability to tell which developments are progressive (and to what degree). So, while disagreement can indeed be a threat to progress, the precise nature of the threat has not been appreciated.

中文翻译：

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分歧会破坏进步吗？

近年来，一些哲学家认为他们的学科没有取得进展（或者与“硬科学”相比还不够）。这种悲观立场的一个关键论据诉诸于一个所谓的事实，即哲学家在大多数主要哲学问题上广泛而系统地存在分歧。在这篇论文中，我们从关于哲学进步的辩论中退后一步，并考虑一个普遍的问题：一门学科内的分歧（如果有的话）将如何破坏该学科的进步？我们驳斥了从分歧到缺乏进展的两种论点，并阐明了两种关于进展与随着时间的推移持续存在或增加的分歧相容的进展说明。然而，我们也认为，分歧会削弱我们判断哪些发展是进步的（以及进步到什么程度）的能力。所以，