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Saying, Commitment, and the Lying-Misleading Distinction
The Journal of Philosophy ( IF 1.6 ) Pub Date : 2022-12-01 , DOI: 10.5840/jphil20221191243 Neri Marsili , Guido Löhr ,
The Journal of Philosophy ( IF 1.6 ) Pub Date : 2022-12-01 , DOI: 10.5840/jphil20221191243 Neri Marsili , Guido Löhr ,
How can we capture the intuitive distinction between lying and misleading? According to a traditional view, the difference boils down to whether the speaker is saying (as opposed to implying) something that they believe to be false. This view is subject to known objections; to overcome them, an alternative view has emerged. For the alternative view, what matters is whether the speaker can consistently deny that they are committed to knowing the relevant proposition. We point out serious flaws for this alternative view, and sketch a simpler alternative that incorporates key insights of the traditional view.
中文翻译:
说、承诺和说谎误导的区别
我们如何捕捉说谎和误导之间的直观区别?根据传统观点,差异归结为说话者是否在说(而不是暗示)他们认为是错误的事情。这种观点受到众所周知的反对;为了克服它们,出现了另一种观点。对于另一种观点,重要的是说话者是否可以始终否认他们致力于了解相关命题。我们指出了这种替代观点的严重缺陷,并勾勒出一个更简单的替代方案,其中包含了传统观点的关键见解。
更新日期:2022-12-01
中文翻译:
说、承诺和说谎误导的区别
我们如何捕捉说谎和误导之间的直观区别?根据传统观点,差异归结为说话者是否在说(而不是暗示)他们认为是错误的事情。这种观点受到众所周知的反对;为了克服它们,出现了另一种观点。对于另一种观点,重要的是说话者是否可以始终否认他们致力于了解相关命题。我们指出了这种替代观点的严重缺陷,并勾勒出一个更简单的替代方案,其中包含了传统观点的关键见解。