According to Sparse views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is exhausted by the experiential presentation of ‘low-level’ properties such as (in the case of vision) shapes, colors, and textures Whereas, according to Rich views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can also sometimes involve experiencing ‘high-level’ properties such as natural kinds, artefactual kinds, causal relations, linguistic meanings, and moral properties. An important dialectical tool in the debate between Rich and Sparse theorists is the so-called ‘method of phenomenal contrast’. I explore how this method of phenomenal contrast interacts with the sort of content-externalism made familiar by Putnam. I show that the possibility of Twin Earth style cases places important restrictions on the range of properties that the method of phenomenal contrast could plausibly apply to. Moreover, these restrictions would apply to some paradigmatically low-level properties as well as to some of the frequently advanced high-level properties. I also draw some general lessons about the different ways one might conceive of the relation between phenomenal character and representational content.

中文翻译：

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知觉内容、现象对比和外在主义

根据知觉内容的稀疏观点，知觉体验的现象特征被“低级”属性的经验呈现所耗尽，例如（在视觉的情况下）形状、颜色和纹理，而根据丰富的知觉观点内容，知觉体验的现象特征有时还涉及体验“高级”属性，如自然种类、人工制品种类、因果关系、语言意义和道德属性。Rich 和 Sparse 理论家之间辩论的一个重要辩证工具是所谓的“现象对比法”。我探讨了这种现象对比方法如何与普特南熟悉的那种内容外在主义相互作用。我展示了双地球类型案例的可能性对显着对比方法可能适用的属性范围施加了重要限制。此外，这些限制将适用于一些典型的低级属性以及一些经常高级的高级属性。我还总结了一些关于人们可能构想现象特征与再现内容之间关系的不同方式的一般性教训。