Epistemologists take themselves to disagree about whether there are situations where it is rational for one to believe that p and rational for one to believe that one’s evidence does not support p (rational akrasia). The embedded sentence ‘one’s evidence does not support p’ can be interpreted in two ways, however, depending on what the semantic contribution of ‘one’s evidence’ is taken to be. ‘One’s evidence’ might be seen as a sheer indexical or as a descriptive singular term. The first interpretation makes the relevant kind of rational akrasia impossible, whereas the second one makes it possible. But the proposition that is taken to be expressed by ‘one’s evidence does not support p’ by each of these interpretations is not the same. We thus have a rational reconstruction of views that are labeled as being for and against the possibility of rational akrasia according to which they do not really contradict each other.

中文翻译：

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关于 Akrasia 的模棱两可的陈述

认识论者不同意在某些情况下，一个人相信 p 是理性的，而一个人相信一个人的证据不支持 p（理性的 akrasia）是理性的。然而，嵌入句子“one's evidence does not support p”可以用两种方式解释，这取决于“one's evidence”的语义贡献被认为是什么。“一个人的证据”可能被视为纯粹的索引性或描述性的单数术语。第一种解释使相关类型的理性 akrasia 成为不可能，而第二种解释使之成为可能。但是，这些解释中的每一种都认为“一个人的证据不支持p”所表达的命题是不一样的。