Wason’s selection task is a paramount experimental problem in the study of human reasoning, often connected with the celebrated ravens paradox in the philosophical literature. Various normative accounts of the selection task rely on a Bayesian approach. Some claim vindication of participants’ rationality. Others don’t, thus following Wason’s original intuition that observed responses are mistaken. In this article we argue that despite claims to the contrary, all these accounts actually speak to the same effect: Wason was right. First, we provide a new accuracy-based analysis of the selection task that includes the existing proposals as special cases. We then show on this basis that none can actually vindicate participants’ rationality. We conclude that all normative renditions considered eventually concur: all in all, Bayesians should follow Wason in the selection task.

中文翻译：

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贝叶斯学派也应该效仿 Wason：基于准确性的选择任务综合分析

沃森的选择任务是人类推理研究中最重要的实验问题，通常与哲学文献中著名的乌鸦悖论有关。选择任务的各种规范说明都依赖于贝叶斯方法。一些人声称这证明了参与者的理性。其他人则不然，因此按照沃森最初的直觉，观察到的反应是错误的。在本文中，我们认为，尽管有相反的说法，但所有这些说法实际上都说明了同样的结果：沃森是对的。首先，我们对选择任务提供了一种新的基于准确性的分析，其中包括作为特殊情况的现有提案。然后我们在此基础上表明，没有人能够真正证明参与者的理性。我们得出的结论是，所有考虑的规范演绎最终都一致：总而言之，贝叶斯主义者应该在选择任务中遵循沃森。