The wrong kind of reason problem is a problem for attempts to analyze normative properties using only facts about the balance of normative reasons, a style of analysis on which the ‘Reasons First’ programme depends. I argue that this problem cannot be solved if the orthodox view of reasons is true --- that is, if each normative reason is numerically identical with some fact, proposition, or state-of-affairs. That’s because solving the wrong kind of reason problem requires completely distinguishing between the right- and wrong-kind reasons for an attitude. I argue that some facts give both right- and wrong-kind reasons for an attitude. Consequently, no such distinction between the two types of reasons is complete if reasons are facts or the like. I conclude by suggesting that reasons and facts are related by constitution, not identity.

错误类型的原因问题是试图仅使用有关规范​​原因平衡的事实来分析规范属性的问题，这是“原因优先”计划所依赖的一种分析方式。我认为，如果正统的理由观是正确的——也就是说，如果每个规范理由在数字上与某个事实、命题或事态相同，那么这个问题就无法解决。那是因为解决错误的原因问题需要完全区分态度的正确和错误原因。我争辩说，有些事实为态度提供了正确和错误的理由。因此，如果原因是事实等，则两种类型的原因之间的这种区分是不完整的。最后，我建议理由和事实是由宪法而不是身份相关联的。