Triviality results threaten plausible principles governing our credence in epistemic modal claims. This paper develops a new account of modal credence which avoids triviality. On the resulting theory, probabilities are assigned not to sets of worlds, but rather to sets of information state-world pairs. The theory avoids triviality by giving up the principle that rational credence is closed under conditionalization. A rational agent can become irrational by conditionalizing on new evidence. In place of conditionalization, the paper develops a new account of updating: conditionalization with normalization.

中文翻译：

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认知模态信任

琐碎的结果威胁到了支配我们对认知模态断言的信任的似是而非的原则。本文开发了一种避免琐碎的模态可信度的新解释。根据由此产生的理论，概率不是分配给世界的集合，而是分配给信息状态-世界对的集合。该理论通过放弃理性信任在条件化下关闭的原则来避免琐碎。通过以新证据为条件，理性的代理人可能会变得不理性。代替条件化，本文开发了一种新的更新描述：条件化与规范化。