We draw upon the mixed gamble perspective to investigate the entry timing decisions made by family firms in the context of cross-border acquisition (CBA) waves. We argue that family-controlled firms trade-off short-term SEW and financial losses in favor of long-term SEW and financial gains, while moving early in CBA waves. Findings suggest that family-controlled firms have a higher preference for early movement compared with nonfamily-controlled firms. Further, we show that founder’s presence on the board and acquirer’s superior performance amplifies the mixed gamble trade-offs, thereby strengthening the relationship between family control and early movement within CBA waves.

我们利用混合赌博的视角来研究家族企业在跨境收购 (CBA) 浪潮中做出的进入时机决策。我们认为，家族控制的公司权衡短期 SEW 和财务损失，以换取长期 SEW 和财务收益，同时在 CBA 浪潮中提前行动。研究结果表明，与非家族控制的公司相比，家族控制的公司更倾向于早期流动。此外，我们表明创始人在董事会中的存在和收购方的卓越表现放大了混合赌博权衡，从而加强了家族控制与 CBA 浪潮中早期流动之间的关系。