Malicious attacks in the power system can eventually result in a large-scale cascade failure if not rectified in a timely manner. These attacks, which are traditionally classified into physical and cyber attacks, can be avoided by using the latest advanced detection mechanisms. However, a new threat called cyber-physical attacks jointly targets both the physical and cyber layers of the system to interfere with the operations of the power grid is more malicious than traditional attacks. In this paper, we propose a new cyber-physical attack strategy where the transmission line is first physically disconnected, the line-outage event is masked to mislead the control center into detecting this as an obvious line outage at a different position in the local area of the power system. Therefore, the topology information in the control center is interfered with as a result of our attack. We also propose a novel procedure for selecting vulnerable lines and analyze the observability of our proposed framework. Our proposed method can effectively and continuously deceive the control center into detecting fake line-outage positions, and thereby increase the chance of cascade failure because the attention is given to the fake outage. The simulation results validate the efficiency of our proposed attack strategy.

中文翻译：

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掩盖线路中断的本地网络物理攻击和智能电网中的拓扑攻击

如果不及时纠正，电力系统中的恶意攻击最终会导致大规模的级联故障。通过使用最新的高级检测机制，可以避免传统上分为物理攻击和网络攻击的这些攻击。但是，一种称为“网络物理攻击”的新威胁共同针对系统的物理层和网络层，以干扰电网的运行比传统攻击更具恶意性。在本文中，我们提出了一种新的网络物理攻击策略，在该策略中，首先物理断开了传输线路，屏蔽了线路中断事件，以误导控制中心将其检测为本地不同位置的明显线路中断电力系统。所以，我们的攻击会干扰控制中心中的拓扑信息。我们还提出了一种新颖的程序来选择易受攻击的线路，并分析了我们提出的框架的可观察性。我们提出的方法可以有效且连续地欺骗控制中心以检测伪造的线路中断位置，从而增加了级联故障的机会，因为要注意伪造的中断。仿真结果验证了我们提出的攻击策略的效率。从而增加了级联故障的机会，因为关注了假故障。仿真结果验证了我们提出的攻击策略的效率。从而增加了级联故障的机会，因为关注了假故障。仿真结果验证了我们提出的攻击策略的效率。