Maximize Expected Choiceworthiness (MEC) is a theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty. It says that we ought to handle moral uncertainty in the way that Expected Value Theory (EVT) handles descriptive uncertainty. MEC inherits from EVT the problem of fanaticism. Roughly, a decision theory is fanatical when it requires our decision-making to be dominated by low-probability, high-payoff options. Proponents of MEC have offered two main lines of response. The first is that MEC should simply import whatever are the best solutions to fanaticism on offer in decision theory. The second is to propose statistical normalization as a novel solution on behalf of MEC. This paper argues that the first response is open to serious doubt and that the second response fails. As a result, MEC appears significantly less plausible when compared to competing accounts of decision-making under moral uncertainty, which are not fanatical.

最大化预期选择价值（MEC）是道德不确定性下的决策理论。它说我们应该以期望值理论（EVT）处理描述性不确定性的方式来处理道德不确定性。 MEC继承了EVT的狂热问题。粗略地说，当决策理论要求我们的决策以低概率、高回报的选项为主时，它就是狂热的。 MEC 的支持者提出了两条主要回应路线。首先，MEC 应该简单地导入决策理论中提供的解决狂热的最佳解决方案。第二个是代表 MEC 提出统计归一化作为一种​​新颖的解决方案。本文认为，第一个回应值得严重怀疑，而第二个回应则失败了。因此，与道德不确定性下决策的竞争性解释相比，MEC 显得不太可信，而道德不确定性并不狂热。