We examine persuasion when the sole source of credibility today is a desire to maintain a public record for accuracy. A long-run sender plays a cheap talk game with a sequence of short-run receivers, who observe some record of feedback about past accuracy. When all feedback is public (as is standard in repeated games), persuasion frequently requires inefficient on-path punishment—even if accuracy is monitored perfectly. If instead the record publishes coarse summary statistics (as is common online), any communication equilibrium the sender prefers to one-shot cheap talk—including Bayesian persuasion—can be supported without cost.

中文翻译：

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长远的说服

当当今可信度的唯一来源是维护公共记录的准确性时，我们会研究说服力。长期发送者与一系列短期接收者玩一个廉价的谈话游戏，这些接收者观察一些有关过去准确性的反馈记录。当所有反馈都是公开的（这是重复游戏中的标准）时，说服常常需要低效的途中惩罚——即使准确度得到完美监控。相反，如果记录发布粗略的摘要统计数据（这在网上很常见），则发送者喜欢一次性廉价谈话的任何通信平衡（包括贝叶斯说服）都可以免费得到支持。