Existing research shows that economic coercion successfully influences targeted states’ behavior 38 percent of the time. This article integrates research on economic sanctions and foreign aid by assessing the relative effectiveness of two types of economic coercion: economic sanctions and foreign aid suspensions. It argues that suspending aid is more effective than adopting economic sanctions because (1) aid suspensions are economically beneficial for the adopting state, while sanctions are costly, (2) aid suspensions directly affect the targeted government’s budget, (3) market forces undermine sanctions but not aid suspensions, and (4) aid suspensions are less likely to spark adverse behavioral reactions. A quantitative analysis estimates the success rate of imposed aid suspensions to be 44 percent and that of economic sanctions to be 26 percent. The results are robust across two alternative datasets on economic coercion, and qualitative evidence corroborates the outlined mechanisms. The findings suggest that economic sanctions are less effective than previously thought and that large donor states have a higher chance of achieving political goals through economic coercion.

中文翻译：

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胡萝卜加大棒：暂停对外援助和经济制裁的效果如何？

现有研究表明，经济胁迫在 38% 的情况下成功影响了目标国家的行为。本文通过评估经济制裁和暂停外援这两种经济胁迫的相对有效性，整合了经济制裁和外援的研究。它认为，暂停援助比采取经济制裁更有效，因为（1）暂停援助对接受国有利，而制裁成本高昂；（2）暂停援助直接影响目标政府的预算；（3）市场力量削弱制裁但暂停援助则不然，(4) 暂停援助不太可能引发不良行为反应。定量分析估计，暂停援助的成功率为 44%，经济制裁的成功率为 26%。关于经济胁迫的两个替代数据集的结果是稳健的，并且定性证据证实了所概述的机制。研究结果表明，经济制裁的效果不如之前想象的那么大，而且大型捐助国通过经济胁迫实现政治目标的机会更大。