Many proposals advocate linking climate and trade policy to improve climate cooperation. Since climate mitigation is non-excludable, mitigation cannot be enforced through issue-specific reciprocity, but linking mitigation with trade penalties on non-participants could incorporate trade’s enforcement powers into a climate club. However, this perspective has overlooked the relationship between climate policy preferences and existing trade flows. Using a model of issue linkage in climate and trade motivated by findings from the domestic political economy of international trade, I show that the necessary conditions for climate clubs are exacting. Effective climate–trade clubs require members with high levels of climate policy ambition, export leverage over laggards, and insulation from trade retaliation. However, I show that these three attributes do not necessarily co-occur theoretically or empirically. States that support the club’s goals on one dimension may undermine them on another. The findings provide insights into institutional design, climate politics, and the constraints on issue linkage in international cooperation.

许多提案主张将气候政策与贸易政策联系起来，以改善气候合作。由于气候缓解措施是非排他性的，因此不能通过针对特定问题的互惠来执行缓解措施，但将缓解措施与对非参与者的贸易处罚联系起来可以将贸易的执行权纳入气候俱乐部。然而，这种观点忽视了气候政策偏好与现有贸易流动之间的关系。我使用由国际贸易的国内政治经济研究结果驱动的气候与贸易问题联系模型，表明气候俱乐部的必要条件是严格的。有效的气候贸易俱乐部要求成员具有高水平的气候政策雄心、对落后者的出口影响力以及免受贸易报复的影响。然而，我证明这三个属性在理论上或经验上不一定同时出现。在某一方面支持俱乐部目标的国家可能会在另一方面破坏这些目标。研究结果提供了对制度设计、气候政治以及国际合作中问题联系的限制的见解。