We examine whether performance reporting leads to inconsistent enforcement at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In a sample of over 13,000 SEC enforcement actions, we show that SEC staff respond to performance-reporting pressures and file more enforcement actions in September, the final month of the SEC's fiscal year, than in any other month. The increase in case volume in September is not fully explained by staff filing more procedural cases or accelerating case filings. Instead, SEC staff pursue less complex cases and agree to more lenient financial and non-financial sanctions to increase case volume in September. We attempt to rule out alternative explanations for our results, including natural SEC workflow and resource constraints. Overall, our findings suggest that performance reporting creates agency conflicts that lead to regulatory inconsistency within the fiscal year.

中文翻译：

---

美国证券交易委员会 (SEC) 9 月飙升：本财年内监管不一致

我们研究绩效报告是否会导致美国证券交易委员会 (SEC) 的执法不一致。在超过 13,000 项 SEC 执法行动的样本中，我们发现 SEC 工作人员应对绩效报告压力，并在 9 月份（SEC 财政年度的最后一个月）提出的执法行动比任何其他月份都多。 9月份案件数量的增加并不能完全解释为工作人员提起更多程序性案件或加快案件立案。相反，SEC 工作人员会追查不太复杂的案件，并同意采取更宽松的金融和非金融制裁，以增加 9 月份的案件数量。我们试图排除对我们的结果的其他解释，包括自然的 SEC 工作流程和资源限制。总体而言，我们的研究结果表明，绩效报告会造成机构冲突，从而导致财政年度内的监管不一致。