Skepticism and naturalism bear important connections with one another. Do they conflict or are they different sides of the same coin? In this paper, by considering the ways in which Sextus and Hume have examined these issues, I offer a Pyrrhonian response to Penelope Maddy's attempt to reject skepticism within the form of naturalism that she calls “second philosophy” (Maddy, 2007, 2017) and to Timothy Williamson's attempt to avoid skepticism from emerging within his knowledge-first approach (Williamson, 2000). Some lessons about Pyrrhonism result.

中文翻译：

---

怀疑主义、自然主义、皮浪主义

怀疑主义和自然主义彼此有着重要的联系。它们是否冲突或者它们是同一枚硬币的不同面？在本文中，通过考虑 Sextus 和 Hume 研究这些问题的方式，我对 Penelope Maddy 试图以她称之为“第二哲学”（Maddy，2007 年，2017 年）的自然主义形式拒绝怀疑主义的尝试做出皮浪式回应，并且蒂莫西·威廉姆森 (Timothy Williamson) 试图避免在他的知识至上方法中出现怀疑主义 (Williamson, 2000)。关于皮浪主义的一些教训结果。