In this paper, I offer three different arguments against the view that knowledge is the epistemic norm governing criminal convictions in the Anglo-American system. The first two show that neither the truth of a juror's verdict nor the juror's belief in the defendant's guilt is necessary for voting to convict in an epistemically permissible way. Both arguments challenge the necessity dimension of the knowledge norm. I then show—by drawing on evidence that is admissible through exclusionary rules—that knowledge is also not sufficient for epistemically proper conviction. A central thesis operative in all of these arguments is that the sort of ideal epistemology underwriting the knowledge norm of conviction should be rejected and replaced with a non-ideal approach. I then defend an alternative, justificationist norm of criminal conviction that not only avoids the problems afflicting the knowledge account, but also takes seriously the important role that narratives play in criminal courts.

中文翻译：

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刑事定罪规范

在本文中，我提出了三种不同的论点，反对知识是英美体系中管理刑事定罪的认知规范的观点。前两个表明，陪审员判决的真实性和陪审员对被告有罪的信念对于以认识论允许的方式投票定罪都不是必需的。这两个论点都对知识规范的必要性维度提出了挑战。然后，我通过利用通过排除规则可以接受的证据来表明，知识也不足以在认知上正确地定罪。在所有这些论点中起作用的一个中心论点是，那种理想的认识论应该拒绝支持定罪的知识规范，并用非理想的方法取而代之。然后，我为另一种刑事定罪辩护规范辩护，它不仅避免了影响知识账户的问题，而且认真对待叙事在刑事法庭中所起的重要作用。