Many have attempted to justify various courts’ position that bare or naked statistical evidence is not sufficient for findings of liability. I provide a particular explanation by examining a different, but related, issue about when and why stereotyping is wrong. One natural explanation of wrongness of stereotyping appeals to agency. However, this has been scrutinised. In this paper, I argue that we should broaden our understanding of when and how our agency can be undermined. In particular, I argue that when we take seriously that our agency is exercised in the social world, we can see that stereotyping can and does undermine our agency by fixing the social meaning of our choices and actions as well as by reducing the quality and the kinds of choices that are available to us. Although this improves the agency-based explanation, it must be noted that undermining agency is not an overriding reason against stereotyping. Much depends on the balance of reasons that take into account moral stakes involved in a case of stereotyping. This results in a messier picture of when and why stereotyping is wrong, but I argue that this is a feature, not a bug. I end by applying this agency-based explanation to cases that have motivated the so-called Proof Paradoxes.

中文翻译：

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证明悖论、代理和刻板印象

许多人试图证明各种法院的立场，即赤裸裸的统计证据不足以认定责任。我通过研究一个不同但相关的问题来提供一个特殊的解释，即刻板印象何时以及为什么是错误的。刻板印象错误的一种自然解释诉诸代理。然而，这已经被审查了。在本文中，我认为我们应该扩大我们对何时以及如何破坏我们的代理权的理解。特别是，我认为，当我们认真对待我们的能动性在社会世界中行使时，我们可以看到，刻板印象可以而且确实会通过固定我们选择和行为的社会意义以及降低质量和影响来破坏我们的能动性。我们可以选择的种类。虽然这改进了基于代理的解释，必须指出，破坏能动性并不是反对陈规定型观念的压倒一切的理由。很大程度上取决于考虑成见案例中涉及的道德风险的原因的平衡。这导致刻板印象何时以及为何错误的图片更加混乱，但我认为这是一个功能，而不是错误。最后，我将这种基于机构的解释应用于引发所谓的证明悖论的案例。